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Abstract
Increased breach occurrences in healthcare cause concern for health information as
reported by the Federal Government. Significant effort, regulations, and safeguards are
in place to protect the systems used in the healthcare industry. Employee handling of
security remains an area of vulnerability related to security protocols. The unified theory
of acceptance and usage of technology (UTAUT) served as the model for this qualitative
exploratory study with the purpose of understanding registered nurse (RN) perceptions
and lived experiences related to IT security. Face-to-face interviews were conducted
with 20 participants from the Three Rivers Chapter American Association Critical Care
Nurses. Transcribed data were analyzed with a priori codes aligned to the constructs of
UTAUT and emergent themes. The emergent themes from the RNs’ lived experiences
revealed perceptions of IT security mishandling, including walking away from the
computer without log-off, and sharing of accounts through single sign on authenticated
badges. Strategic planning for the organizational IT security may be strengthened due to
the insight about the RNs’ workflow related to IT security. Understanding employee
perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors to IT security allows for
the ability as managers to apply that knowledge to IT security systems, access methods,
and implement procedures that will provide for increased organizational IT security and
increased patient confidence. The social change from this work may provide
contributions to the development of IT infrastructure systems for healthcare helping to
create and maintain continued access to and availability of electronic medical records and
data for increasing numbers of people who need health maintenance and care.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Security systems and the security of information technology (IT) have multiple
components. When these components are being managed in a complex environment, the
exposure of having a weak link is monumental. Ferguson, Schneier, and Kohno (2011)
described the weakest link property as security being only as strong as the weakest link
and they suggested that all users of IT understand the weakest link property and
associated results.
Employees within healthcare each hold responsibility toward maintaining the IT
security of the system by using security practices set forth within the organization. One
important area for the organization is password use to access the network and other
clinical devices. For all healthcare IT, security is a critical aspect that requires protection
and operational safeguards (Kruger & Anschutz, 2013). The registered nurses’ (RNs’)
perceptions of IT security are not well known and may influence the IT security risk
management. Further study into this gap of knowledge was the foundation for this study.
Security practices include many aspects of password management that are clearly
prescribed by the healthcare IT experts. Unfortunately, these are not well understood or
even known by clinical practice employees who are on the front lines of operational
areas. Furguson et al. (2011) discussed the development of improper passwords, and
Albarrak (2012), Fernández-Alemán et al. (2015), and Medlin et al., (2008) were able to
identify password mishandling by nurses, healthcare workers, and employees. In this
study, I explored the RNs’ perceptions of the IT security practices that are part of their
professional role as seen through the lens of the behavioral constructs from the model of
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the unified theory of acceptance and usage of technology (UTAUT), Venkatesh, Morris,
Davis, and Davis, (2003) used as the conceptual framework for this study.
In Chapter 1, I will outline the plan for the study and will include the background
of the study, statement of the problem, purpose of the study, research questions,
conceptual framework, nature of the study, definitions, assumptions, scope and
delimitations, limitations, and the significance of the study. In the section of the
significance of the study, I will describe the importance to the practice, theory, and social
change.
Background of the Study
Security of IT in healthcare organizations is the responsibility of all employees
within the organization, and most of those within would suspect that a breach in security
would come from the outside. However, according to Simpson (1996), most security
issues are caused inadvertently by security mishandling internal to the organization. Arce
(2003) identified that the current weakest link is the personal computer in combination
with people’s behaviors that create excessive vulnerability and produce insecure systems.
These behaviors were identified in the top seven reasons for a data breach associated with
authorized internal users (Kruger & Anschutz, 2013). Tam, Glassman, and
Vandenwauver (2010) discussed that human behavior is the weakest link in the
maintenance of internet security because of the individual level of the knowledge and use
of the passwords. The behavior and use of the password practice by individuals, as it
relates to the Internet, are behaviors that translate into other areas that require password
protection (Cheswick, 2013). Passwords are only a single aspect of the IT security within
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the healthcare organization, which is a critical factor protecting access to the frontline
security of the data and operations of the organization. This data includes protected
health information that is governed by several regulations including the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH), and other regulatory oversight. IT
security is complex, management of the IT security involves protecting the network,
managing the users, and maintaining the appropriate IT security tools (Kruger &
Anschutz, 2013). Liu, Chung, Chen, and Wang (2012) identified that the healthcare
security threats came from the employees internal to the system in 70% of the cases.
These authors identified the complexity of variables in healthcare that leads to the many
factors for potential internal breach of the system (Liu et al., 2012). Like Simpson and
Arce, Liu et al. identified the need for internal users to have knowledge of information
security and good practice related to that experience.
The healthcare industry uses IT security practices in both the clinical equipment
for patient care and most of the patient information gathering, maintenance, and transfer
within the acute care hospital environment as well as billing and collection. The methods
and level of the security maintenance by every RN are paramount to the organizational
protection and overall risk management. The behaviors they employ with the use of
passwords and the security practices may correlate with the description by Kruger and
Anschutz (2013) who discussed the access to the electronic patient health information
gained either maliciously or nonmaliciously within the organizations. These described
behaviors and variant accessing of systems may be one cause for healthcare to be leading
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in the number of data breaches as recorded in 2011 as among the top 10 industries
(Kruger & Anschutz, 2013).
Personal information security has become progressively more important with
increased public awareness that has been heightened for multiple reasons, including
increased reporting within the public-sector news reports, regular governmental
statements, and targeted marketing to the public. O'Harrow (2012) published an
investigative report identifying the many vulnerabilities of IT security occurring within
the healthcare industry identified over the course of a year. These included password
mishandling, insecure practices, known security access issues that were left unaddressed,
and wireless device access points that were insecure, each allowing the organization open
for risk of breach.
With the recent hacking of Anthem, one of the United States largest Health
Insurers, the American people are even more aware of vulnerabilities toward personal
information and health information (Abelson & Goldstein, 2015, Balbi, 2015).
Information to approximately 80 million records was available to the hackers once they
gained entrance into the Anthem system. A phishing scam was used to access the
credentials of five employees from Anthem as reported by Amerigroup, the operating
company of Anthem (Balbi, 2015). Similar reports were reported by Verizon in the 2011
data breach experience where phishing emails were opened and malware infected the
executives’ laptops allowing access to the system (Baker et al., 2011).
Access to health records is more desirable than gaining access to general credit
accounts because the files from health records contain more information such as Social
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Security numbers, birth dates, addresses of the individual and significant others,
employment information, emergency contact information, and other personal
information. A collection of such personal information allows for rapid high-level
identity theft. Finkle (2013) discussed that Dell Secure Works identified in a recent
report that hackers can sell complete health insurance credentials for $20 per set of data
as opposed to $1 to $2 for each credit card number with a security code in underground
markets. The magnitude of potential profit with this type of transaction creates a very
strong interest in the sale of this information that is causing the healthcare organizations
to be more inviting targets for hackers and social engineers. Finkle also discussed the
statements by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) warning that healthcare remains
vulnerable to cyber-attacks.
Within the healthcare organization, employees functioning in the clinical arena
face accessing the electronic systems and devices during and between patient care
activities. Each of these situations requires interaction with both the patient and the
medical record and clinical devices. The electronic health record is necessary for
accessing and gathering information as well as entering data by members of the clinical
team for varying reasons at differing points during the care continuum. Potential issues
that occur within each of these employee encounters with technology without accurate IT
security becomes a management and organizational problem. Employees using the
systems without the application of principles from the four constructs of UTAUT
(Venkatesh et al., 2003) may not appreciate or understand the importance or consequence
of risk under which they place the organization.
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A review of the literature related to the healthcare organization IT security reveals
three important avenues for the future including: (a) the state of IT in the healthcare
system interwoven with the employee perception, (b) the reporting structure with
oversight management by the healthcare leadership, and (c) where the healthcare IT is
headed in the future. Bigalke (2009) discussed in order to fill the healthcare IT gap by
2015 that it would take a focused effort and critical goals to change behaviors of staff
while bringing in new technologies. The existing literature aimed at the clinical provider
presents the current state of IT security in healthcare as being focused on the electronic
medical record and HIPAA.
Simpson (1996) discussed that a lack of policy and procedure, education, and
oversight from leadership within the organizations allows for breaches in the security. IT
leadership, healthcare organizations, and orientation programs have made strong attempts
to address many of the issues that Simpson had discussed in the 90s. Some organizations
have implemented consequences causing workforce employee fear of not following the
rules to be an effective measure for successful implementation (Workman, Bommer, &
Straub, 2009). Compliance with the security practice continues to be anecdotally
reported in the popular business and healthcare literature and is captured along with the
reports of the security breaches as they occur. The business management problem
continues to exist because there is a lack of research and insight into how breaches and
violations of the security occur. Simpson (1996) and Gaunt (2000) more than 15 years
ago identified the lack of personal and professional responsibility to follow policies for
information and system IT security. There appears to be an abundance of literature
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written related to the strengthening of policy and procedure within the healthcare
organization IT and recommendations made for the education of staff associated with the
security measures.
Problem Statement
IT initiatives and the security focuses in healthcare organizations have been
related primarily to the electronic medical record, HIPAA, and business applications, all
of which are aimed at protecting patient and organizational confidentiality and security
(Graham, 2010). Measures taken to protect this security involve a vast array of security
aspects, which protect the hardware and software applications used by employees of the
healthcare organizations. Even though the aspects associated with security fall within the
scope of IT security, they require operational management and oversight. One particular
measure of the security management in healthcare is the maintenance of password
confidentiality and security (Cazier & Medlin, 2006).
Currently, 37.4% of all hospital labor costs are comprised of RN labor (Welton,
2011). As the RNs make up such a large portion of the employee base and are using the
technology applications for multiple purposes, it is important to identify their knowledge
related to the implications and consequences of the security risk and breach. Albarrak
(2012) identified that the behaviors of nurses allow for the potential security risk related
to the password practices. Nurses have been found to mishandle the passwords through
sharing their information, exchanging the passwords, and ignoring the need for the
password resets in Albarrak’s study (2012). Fernández-Alemán et al. identified a
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password sharing rate of 31.7% among healthcare workers. Medlin et al. (2008) were
able to show findings of 73% of respondents having shared their passwords.
Security of healthcare IT is the responsibility of everyone within the organization.
All employees are to have some understanding of what consequences might occur with
an IT security breach. The risk of the IT security breach occurring from internal security
violations is a real threat to an organization (Chopra, 2013). An internal breach of IT
security may occur in many ways; however, for purposes of this study, inclusion of
violations of the security practices, sharing or other mishandling of a password, and lack
of the logoff procedure were explored. The business management problem is that
employee mishandling of IT security poses undue risk to an organization for potential
risk of breach.
Healthcare organizations expend huge amounts of resources, both human and
financial, in efforts to protect the IT security. At the core of this IT security is the intent
to sustain the provision of integrated healthcare using electronic systems with vast
communication and trust. When this cycle of IT security is disrupted there is potential
risk to the quality of care provided and the confidence of information being handled
within the organization. The narrower aspect of the problem, that of understanding RNs’
perceptions of IT security and related behaviors have not been explored in the literature.
There is a documented and known need for IT security within the healthcare environment
and that RNs have a responsibility to maintain IT security. Consistent with the healthcare
literature being limited to the research targeting the security as identified by Appari and
Johnson (2010), the subset of the literature that would address the perception of the RN
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users maintaining responsibility for and proper application of the IT security as part of
their professional role is absent. There is a gap in knowledge related to the RNs’
perception of what their role is in maintaining the IT security.
Purpose of the Study
Little research exists to provide reliable information to address the business
management problem of RNs’ perceptions of their role in relationship to IT security and
how they manage passwords. To gain insight into this gap, a qualitative study was
conducted “searching for meaning and understanding” (Merriam, 2014, p. 39) from the
perspective of the employees own contextual interactions within the healthcare
organization. The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore the perceptions of
the RN within four of the constructs of UTAUT that are specific to use behavior
(Venkatesh et al., 2003). The experiences and perceptions of the RN were analyzed as
they relate to the UTAUT constructs of performance expectancy, effort expectancy,
social influence, and facilitating conditions. Themes that emerged within each construct
were independently analyzed.
The outcomes of this study are now available to provide insight into a large
portion of the healthcare workforce, thus allowing employee education and development
to become a part of organizational frameworks. The elimination or reduction of barriers
in the security practices that are necessary within the healthcare workforce must allow for
engagement with the employee allowing that employee the ability to perceive how the
UTAUT constructs of performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence, and
facilitating conditions are each applicable in relation to IT security. If employees
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perceive these constructs as pertinent to practice, they will apply them to the work and
maintain the security of the system. The risk to overall security breach for the
organization is likely to then be reduced due to the increased provision of improvements
to the global security practice.
Research Questions
The following is the overarching question that was used for this qualitative study:
What are RNs’ perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors of IT
security?
The following research questions provided the supportive data designed to guide
the work of this research using the four constructs of UTAUT that are consistent with
behavioral intention and use behavior.
RQ 1: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors
of the performance expectancy of IT security practice?
RQ 2: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors
of the effort expectancy related to the IT security practice?
RQ 3: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors
of the social influence related to the IT security practice?
RQ 4: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors
of the facilitating conditions of the IT security practice?
Conceptual Framework
Venkatesh et al. (2003) described the model UTAUT, which served as the
theoretical base to support and guide this research work of the security practices of RNs.
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This theoretical base provided the foundational framework to identify the clinicians’
knowledge levels, understanding of the password management processes, implications of
a breach, and the applications of both the policy incorporation and education of the
security practice within the acute care environment. Venkatesh et al.’s use of identifying
and incorporating the determinants that influence the behavioral intentions to use
technology within UTAUT is an ideal match for this study. Use of this model provided
the depth and breadth necessary for the assessment of the definition and relationships to
guide exploration toward identifying perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported
behaviors of the RNs within the study structure. The UTAUT model delves into the
construct of use behavior that lies at the core of adoption and sustaining practice.
Venkatesh et al. (2003) developed and validated the UTAUT model and they
claimed the previously published acceptance theories were fragmented and incomplete in
nature. The like context and components from eight models of theory were incorporated
for analysis, testing, validation, and final confirmation that the UTAUT model would
stand statistically proven having clearer definition and improvement toward the intention
of behavior. Following testing within the study, UTAUT was shown to perform stronger
than the eight models from which it was drawn. This strong performance is one of the
reasons UTAUT had been chosen for the work of measuring the security practices of
RNs. Four of the seven constructs identified within UTAUT are important in the
behavior of the user as identified by Venkatesh et al. The four constructs include
performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence, each of which contributes to
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behavioral intention, and then facilitating conditions, which contribute to use behavior
along with the behavioral intentions (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Constructs of UTAUT contributing to use behavior. Adapted and used with
permission from CCC (Appendix 1) from “User Acceptance of Information Technology:
Toward a Unified View,” by V. Venkatesh, M. G. Morris, G. B. Davis, and F. D. Davis,
2003, MIS Quarterly, 46(2), p. 447.
The four UTAUT constructs that are described in this study, performance
expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence, and facilitating conditions, appeal to the
specific aspect of the security practice that was explored. Performance expectancy plays
a role in the employees’ usage of the security practices. The belief the employees have
will help them maintain aspects of their job that pertain to the patient, medical record,
and system security. Exploration of how the identified employee perceives that work is
influenced by the security practices and may or may not be enhanced or improved by
these practices. Effort expectancy is associated with how easy it is to use the security
practices. Employee perceptions related to the security practice ease may have a direct
correlation with the utilization of those security practices. Social influence is the method
for which the employee perceives his or her peers or significant other relevant
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professionals in the clinical environment believe they should be using the security
practices. Within this study, the employee perceptions of social influence was an
important aspect of the clinical setting related to varying levels of social support that may
or may not permit sharing of passwords, mishandling of passwords, and other security
issues, including no log-off.
Facilitating conditions, as perceived by the employee, include the technical
methods that support the RN in using the security practices. There was expected to be a
direct correlation between employee perceptions of the security practice facilitation
through the conditions of technical approaches in this study exploration. Each of these
constructs helped to convey insight and understanding to the security practice of the
employee in the healthcare work environment. The literature review within Chapter 2
provides more in depth detail and insight into the conceptual framework information and
methods as they were planned for this study.
Nature of the Study
A qualitative case study design was used to determine the perceived experiences
of the RNs recruited for this study. The value of a qualitative study brings into view the
meaning of the problem being studied within the research as the user sees, experiences, or
understands his or her world (Merriam, 2014). The qualitative study allows for
interviewing the employees of the organization thus providing insight into the RNs’
perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors of the IT security and
while using the constructs of UTAUT to guide the research. The interview is better to
understand the lived experience of the individuals by listening to their stories and
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collecting A priori results aligned to the constructs of UTAUT and emergent themes not
necessarily bounded.
The advantage that the qualitative case study with an interview process allowed
over the quantitative methodology included the indepth description and analysis of the
phenomenon for which the RN was experiencing related to the use of the IT security
practices. Within this study, determining the interaction of significant factors within the
healthcare environment and the role they play in the constructs of UTAUT were
conducted. These are aspects that would not be able to reveal themselves in a
quantitative study, thus it was a potential advantage of the qualitative approach with
interviewing.
Data gathering and maintainance was done using ethical research principles. The
population was drawn from within the professional nursing organization of critical care
nurses in the acute healthcare rich regional area of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The
requirements of participation included that the individual must be an RN and also a
member of the professional organization Three Rivers Chapter American Association of
Critical Care Nurses (AACN), work full time in a clinical environment, have been
oriented to the work environment, have authentication (sign on) privileges to the
electronic record in the work environment, and have access to the work policies. The
results of this qualitative case study were based on the representation from the personal
interviews. I conducted interviews with 20 participants and had saturation reached within
that population. The data analysis software NVivo v11 was used to facilitate the process
of coding, sorting, trending, and managing the data. Themes emerged from the data, and
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I analyzed those themes. Chapter 3 provides a more in-depth description of interview,
data collection, and data maintenance processes, along with the data analysis strategy.
Definitions
For the purposes of this study, the following terms are defined:
Authentication: Method of identification or validation that the user is legitimate
and may have entry to the system for which he or she is attempting to access resources or
services (Milenković, Latinović, & Simić, 2013, Rajarajan, Prabhu, Palanivel, &
Karthikeyan, 2014).
Clinical workflow: This is the pattern of RN work in time and motion as it relates
to patient care, assessment, medication administration, patient information
communication and documentation, charge nurse and preceptor duties, incorporation of
clinical devices and technology including the electronic medical record, and other work
of the clinical environment as carried out by the RN as part of an assignment
responsibility according to policy and procedure or protocol/practice (Kashiwagi et al.,
2016, Koloroutis, 2004, Zheng, Haftel, Hirschl, O'Reilly, & Hanauer, 2010).
Clinician: A person such as a doctor or nurse who works directly with patients
rather than in a laboratory or as a researcher (Clinician, n.d.).
Intranet: This is a connection of workstations, personal computers, clinical
devices sharing information, or host systems that are all internally managed in the
organization and for internal use (Liu et al., 2012). A firewall protects the intranet
creating a separateness from the Internet that is private.
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IT security policy awareness: This is the individual awareness of the
consequences of failing to comply with the organizational security policies (Rotvold,
2008).
Security practice: This is the behavior the nurses use to maintain the security or
not by properly authenticating and maintaining the security of their accounts in order to
protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data (Chopra, 2013).
Security risk: This is influenced by the security practice and is defined as a threat
that the password privacy or other access to the account has exposure of a kind including
a violation during use due to deviation from policy, protocol, or practice, that has allowed
for the threat of harm potentially rendering the system no longer secure (Rotvold, 2008).
Single sign on (SSO): A system functionality providing the end user the ability to
authenticate only one time yet have full use of all systems for which they would usually
be required to provide authentication (Milenković et al., 2013). This functionality will
allow the user increased ease of use and decreased time spent authenticating.
Wireless on wheels (WOW): This is a common term used for a mobile cart with a
computer that can be used for clinical applications.
Assumptions
A working assumption of this qualitative study was that I would act as an
effective and unbiased data collection instrument with the competencies and abilities
required of an interviewer including each of the following: (a) a questioning stance with
regard to work and life context, (b) high tolerance for ambiguity, (c) being a careful
observer, (d) asking good questions, (e) thinking inductively, and (f) comfort with writing
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(Merriam, 2014). It was assumed that there would be a full review of the interview tool
to assure that the tool was unbiased prior to use for the interview. I would perform with
integrity and an ethically unbiased stance throughout the interview (Merriam, 2014). I
would use bracketing to avoid bias. Registered nurses of the Three Rivers Chapter
AACN would have e-mail accounts and have access to the Internet. This medium allows
for communication, access, and response, to research communication. There was also an
assumption that RNs of the Three Rivers Chapter AACN would be capable of
participating in research. The environment of work within most organizations allows for
and encourages professional participation in research. Research participation is a cultural
norm and part of the mission statement within the professional realm of nursing at the
Three Rivers Chapter of AACN. It was assumed that the RNs have had previous
exposure to the terms used in this research study and had a basic understanding of IT
security. Another assumption was that the RNs within the membership of Three Rivers
Chapter of AACN would voluntarily participate and that they would answer honestly and
completely when interviewed in the research study becoming an integral influence to the
integrity of the study.
Scope and Delimitations
The scope of this research was limited to one specific professional group, the
RNs. The participating professional RNs were geographically chosen from one specific
professional organization within a large geographic region. The content of understanding
and exploration is targeted to areas concerning the security practice, security risk, and
security awareness. The four constructs of UTAUT (a) performance expectancy, (b)
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effort expectancy, (c) social influence, and (d) facilitating conditions were explicitly
explored. The results of the RN perceptions of the IT security is reported and discussed
in Chapter 4. The research boundaries were determined by the population contributing to
the data collection and overall research findings. Exploration for context-dependent
knowledge emerged at the point when saturation was reached with this population.
Limitations
Limitations of this study included that the study sample of RNs represented a
single professional nursing organization and therefore lacked generalizability. The
results from this population represent the security behaviors that can be provided in a
limited descriptive presentation but are not be predictive of the future behaviors of other
RN populations due to multiple contributing factors within each geographic region and
organization. Additionally, the study participants were self-reporting. Limitations of
self-reported results may contain bias, are not able to be verified, and are influenced by
past or current situational experience (Brutus, Aguinis, & Wassmer, 2013). The members
may have experienced frequent surveying by their hospitals, other agencies, and other
researchers that could have created the limitation of a lower yield in an interest of
participating in this study. Lastly, a final limitation is that the RN’s concern for the
identification or potential for leakage of information potentially leading to disciplinary
action due to variance from policy may have yielded false or dishonest response, limited
response, or nonresponse to the questions within the interview process.
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Significance of the Study
The potential yield for positive social change as it relates to the IT security and
the impact that it has in the healthcare arena is substantial. Chen, Nyemba, and Malin
(2012) discussed that the lack of security in the healthcare systems may be due to the
complexity and allows for risk behavior related to electronic medical record handling.
There are many challenges in the healthcare industry related to security and management
of the security systems. Public perception of the protected health information security
and confidence of the security of their individual files are of high importance. Through
the identification of the security behaviors, organizations may be able to convey a strong
public confidence in an improved manner with stronger public perception.
Significance to Practice
For most individuals, healthcare providers and administrators, the aspects of the
security are considered to include the electronic medical record and the aspects of
HIPAA, but they do not often think of the operational systems and management
objectives that are required to secure the systems and tools used to house and access
information. The IT security system for not only patient information but organizational
information is large and complex including but not limited to servers, data warehouses,
networks, Internet, intranet, multiple vendor clinical products (both hardware and
software), and the most commonly thought of accessioning devices such as personal
computers. Organizational leaders must manage and safeguard the employee practices as
they relate to the IT security including workflows and authentication practices.
Awareness of the employees practice to carry out the accurate procedure and process for
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security behavior and management may be an arduous task. Insight into how registered
nurses, one specific group of healthcare employees, practice and relate to the IT security
will influence development and security system builds. Stronger insight and
understanding of employee use of the security applications will allow administrative and
IT oversight to create the policy and procedure that are nurse, clinician, employee, and
patient care friendly so that the healthcare organizations are less susceptible to risk.
Removal or reduction of the barriers to using the IT security along with an improved
insight of employee perception will be helpful in developing a stronger process for
creating the security compliance.
Significance to Theory
Future research recommendations by Venkatesh et al. (2003) included
understanding organizational outcomes associated with the technology. The current
literature related to theory does not connect the IT security practices of employees with
the perceptions of the four constructs of UTAUT that contribute to use behavior.
Allowing a pathway for understanding the connection between theory and perception
may lead to a positive change in behavior of use as the constructs become meaningful as
related to IT security in healthcare.
Outcomes of this work did provide insight into the role of the employees in the
healthcare organizations related to the IT security allowing for a refreshed, focused, and
successful planning and governance approach to the organizational IT security within the
strategic plan. This study contributes to the field of IT security-specific to the healthcare
security management and risk mitigation. It adds new knowledge in the fields of
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employee behavior related to the security and creates awareness regarding the importance
of the perceptions of the RNs role related to the security management. Based on the
findings of this work a framework will be established from which social change may be
promoted by helping employees to gain ease of use in the security practices. The change
in the promotion of the security practices may be accomplished by eliminating or
reducing barriers that will decrease the risk of protected health information release and
overall security breaches for an organization thus improving global security practice.
In the workflow of nursing practice, the role of maintaining IT security is an
elemental part of the RN role and may be a newly recognized finding from this study. If
this is an outcome, there will be an opportunity for nurses to be within the early adopter
stage of IT security. Taken from Rogers's Diffusion of Innovations (1962), “An early
adopter or Lighthouse Customer is an early customer of a given company, product, or
technology; in politics, fashion, art, and other fields, this person would be referred to as a
trendsetter” (p. 283).
Significance to Social Change
Utilization behavior of the employee is determined through four of the constructs
identified by Venkatesh et al. (2003). If the employee perceives these to be important,
then he or she will find the purpose of the IT security to be valuable and applicable to
their practice. The anticipated implications to social change for the healthcare industry
include identifying the gap between current theory and perception of employees related to
IT security. The lack of secure password handling by nurses as described by both
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Albarrak (2012) and Medlin et al. (2008) in each of their respective studies identifies one
large subset of healthcare employees who expose the healthcare organization to risk.
Healthcare costs in the United States of America were at 17.4 % of the gross
domestic product in 2013, according to the Medicare and Medicaid Services (2014).
These healthcare costs include the burden of technology costs, security, and breach
recovery. Improvements in the process related to the IT security in the healthcare arena
would allow for a potential impact of cost reduction, patient safety, and patient
satisfaction. Provided the employees were engaged within each of the four constructs
that lead to use behavior the resulting change in security protection would ultimately
position healthcare for cost reductions as a result of the decreased breach and risk.
Agaku, Adisa, Ayo-Yusuf, and Connolly (2014) concluded that increased strategies
include higher security for the protected health information so that the trust of the
information security will not be undermined any further. Recent public reports of
security breaches within the healthcare insurance companies serve to continue the media
surge that raise general citizen concern that hospitals are more at risk causing lack of
confidence. The general public is concerned with privacy and their general security of
the information. The Federal Governments Office for Civil Rights at the Department of
Human Services reported that over the last 5 years, there were 740 major security
breaches within healthcare that affected 29 million people (as cited in Abelson &
Goldstein, 2015). Increasing the security within the healthcare organizations creates a
more confident feeling for patients individually and extends to the global public who
become more comfortable. The work of identifying one population’s perceptions with
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gained insight and potential for improvement of the IT security behavior and handling of
security practices may become the catalyst to some of the change that is needed in
healthcare security processes related to IT management that will promote increased
patient confidence.
Through these aspects of the research, positive social change may be fully
realized in two categories. The first is that when users are more confident that
information is secure, they are more apt to use the electronic health record and with
increased use, there is potential for maximizing healthcare delivery. Second, when
organizations are able to reduce costs and resources used for security, those resources can
be deployed for other healthcare contributions, such as providing additional disease
prevention, community education, and further research toward healthcare advancements.
Summary and Transition
One-third of the labor force within the hospital is comprised of RNs, and they
make critical decisions related to the operational use of current information systems. The
RN influences his/her peers, subordinates, and other professionals within the clinical
teams. Identifying RN knowledge related to the implications and consequences of the
system and information security risk and breach are important. By researching the RNs
operational applications of the security practice and security risk behaviors, there will be
a new benefit to the organization for multiple purposes. The nurses’ perceptions,
expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors of the IT security were explored using
the process outlined in this chapter. Chapter 2 encompasses a review of the literature
presenting a foundational frame for this work. In this review, I will identify the IT
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security in the healthcare setting as it relates to nursing and nursing awareness of a
potential breach and risk management. The theoretical UTAUT model is incorporated
into the review along with the IT security literature and a discussion of the application
into the clinical environment. A view through the lens of the security awareness and how
organizations approach education and policy setting are included in the review. Chapter
3 includes the research design, qualitative case study methodology, development of the
interview tool, data collection methods, and methods for data coding, data analysis, and
statistical analysis. Chapter 4 covers the discussion of techniques used for analysis of the
data revealing findings in relationship to the research questions. Finally, Chapter 5
addresses the implications of the findings along with limitations and conclusions of the
work, as well as any identified avenues for future research. Implications for social
change are incorporated into the final discussion.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Within Chapter 2, literature is identified and reviewed to frame and set a
foundation for this qualitative case study of the security practices of registered nurses
(RNs). Information Technology (IT) security and breach literature are available in depth
and breadth in many fields and specialties. The literature focus for this study is narrowed
to the management of IT security specific to the way that healthcare employees take a
role in the safeguarding of such. Literature search strategy methods, an overview of the
literature review search, conceptual framework, and literature associated with the
foundational development of the research are discussed.
This study relates to Albarrak’s (2012) research that found nurses used
inappropriate security practice and password handling and then discussed that their
behavior may pose a security threat up to and including a breach. The business
management problem proposed for exploration is the aspect of employee handling of IT
security and the level of risk upon an organization with an associated potential for risk of
breach. A data breach may occur in confidential patient information, proprietary
information, and general organizational risk mitigation efforts if the mishandling of IT
security occurs. The focus on IT security was explored through the lens of the unified
theory of acceptance and usage of technology (UTAUT). The purpose of this study was
to explore the perceptions of the RN within four of the constructs of UTAUT that are
specific to use behavior (Venkatesh et al., 2003). Within this chapter, I reviewed current
literature that relates to the concepts of IT security within the realm of security practices
that nurse would use when managing a password and logging on and off of systems for
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which they are authorized to authenticate and access. Literature related to the purpose of
this study is aimed at inclusion of violations of security practices, sharing or other
mishandling of a password, lack of logoff, and the theoretical framework of UTAUT.
The aspects of IT security in alignment with the four constructs of UTAUT remained the
focus of the literature review even though there are many other concerns of an internal
breach of security.
Literature Search Strategy
I accessed the Walden Library for scholarly peer-reviewed literature using the
search engines EBSCO host, AIB/INFORMS Complete, MEDLINE, CINAHL Plus,
PUBMED, COMPUTERS and APPLIED SCIENCESCOMPLETE, and Google Scholar.
While using these search engines, the key search terms of security, breach, password(s),
information technology, nurse(s), and healthcare were used. The initial Boolean search
via EBSCO host using search terms information technology, security, and healthcare
yielded 183 articles. The Boolean search via EBSCO host using search terms
information technology, security, and nursing yielded 18 articles. The Boolean search
via EBSCO host using search terms technology, security, and nursing yielded 107
articles. Password searches related to nursing produced only one article. Literature
analysis did not result in a significant volume of scholarly works and journal articles that
addressed security related to password use in the healthcare setting. Literature related to
the theoretical foundation for this research, which focused on UTAUT and the other
acceptance models of technology that were precursors are included in the conceptual
framework. The precursors to UTAUT include the technology acceptance model as it
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evolved in 2003 (TAM 2), the original technology acceptance model (TAM), and the
seminal work done by Rogers (2003) the fifth edition of his original work Diffusion of
Innovations all of which were accessed and incorporated into this review.
Conceptual Framework
The incorporation of theory into this chapter required a thorough investigation of
the books and journal articles related to IT and are discussed within the major themes of
IT adoption, application, and usage. The theme of perception, as it relates to behavior, is
described in the works of the developing theories of IT adoption. The theme of IT
adoption, application, and usage theory work, which has evolved through Rogers (2003),
Venkatesh, and Davis, (2000), and Venkatesh et al. (2003) is discussed and reviewed.
These works and their constructs are discussed in detail as they have been evolving since
the inception of the initial diffusion model with adoption to the application of this study
using constructs from within UTAUT.
The theoretical foundation for this study is the unified theory of acceptance and
usage of technology (UTAUT) as described by Venkatesh et al. (2003). The four core
constructs that influence behavioral intention to use technology within UTAUT that are
discussed and used for this study include performance expectancy, effort expectancy,
social influence, and facilitating conditions.
Performance expectancy plays a role in the RNs’ usage of the security practices
due to the belief it will help them maintain aspects of their job that pertain to patient,
medical record, and system security. Within the construct of performance expectancy,
the user finds the system to be useful in his or her job and helpful in accomplishing tasks,
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improving productivity, and increasing opportunity for pay increase (Venkatesh et al.,
2003). Exploration of how the RN perceives that work is influenced by the security
practices and may or may not be enhanced or improved by these practices. When the
culture of the organization supports IT security, there may be an inherent tendency
toward support of the necessary behaviors within this construct.
Effort expectancy is associated with how easy it is to use the security practices.
Within the construct of effort expectancy, the user finds the system to help with clear
communication, improve system skill, create ease of system use, and make learning easy
(Venkatesh et al., 2003). Within this study exploration of RN perceptions of security
practice ease may have a direct correlation to the use of those security practices that were
explored. When IT security is part of the workflow and is helpful to clinical care,
employees are more likely to include the associated behaviors required to carry the
security measures out fully.
Social influence is the method by which the RN perceives others, such as his or
her peers or significant other important professionals in the clinical environment and the
belief that they should be using the security practices. Within the construct of social
influence, the user believes that the way he or she uses the system is important to their
peers and will influence their use as well as the reverse their peers are influential to the
way he or she are using the system. Equally important within this construct is that if the
business leaders believe the system should be used, and the organization supports the
system use these influences may have social influence on the end users (Venkatesh et al.,
2003). Within this study, the RN perceptions of social influence are an important aspect
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within the clinical setting related to varying levels of social support that may or may not
permit sharing of passwords, mishandling of passwords, and other security issues such as
no log-off.
Facilitating conditions as perceived by the RN, include the technical methods that
support the RN in using the security practices. Within the construct of facilitating
conditions, the users believe they have resources and knowledge required to use the
system, they determine if it is compatible with other systems that they use, and they have
someone to assist them when needed (Venkatesh et al., 2003). Within this study,
exploration of RN perceptions of security practice facilitation through the conditions of
technical approaches was expected to have a direct correlation.
Each of these constructs help to understand the security practice of the RN in the
clinical environment while performing the duties of clinical workflow. Venkatesh et al.
(2003) described the performance expectancy, effort expectancy, and social influence as
the three direct determinates of intention to use the system. These constructs along with
the facilitating conditions described as a direct determinant of usage behavior are the
reasons for these four constructs being chosen as the foundational constructs from which
to conduct this study.
Adoption of technology is an area of important literature as it relates to the human
interactions with technology applicable to the development of UTAUT. Historically, the
first provision for context of adoption and diffusion of innovation that explained the
acceptance of technology using empirical models derived from social cognitive theory
began with Rogers (2003). Rogers (2004) identified attributes contributing to adoption
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that include, (a) relative advantage: The innovation is perceived as better than the
precursor, (b) ease of use: Degree to which innovation is perceived to be difficult to use,
(c) image: Perception that the innovation will enhance one’s status, (d) visibility: Ability
to see the system used within the organization, (e) compatibility: Degree to which
innovation can coexist with values, culture, and goals of adopters, (f) results
demonstrability: Ability of using the innovation results, and (g) voluntariness of use:
Perception of innovation being voluntary.
The technology acceptance model (TAM) was later described by Davis (1989) at
which time the user acceptance behavior was defined. TAM revealed that the individual
user has an attitude toward the system that influences his/her beliefs about the system,
which in turn determines how he or she will react and use the system. Within the
development of TAM the following constructs are identified: (a) perceived usefulness,
(b) perceived ease of use, (c) external variables, (d) attitude toward using, and (e)
behavioral intention to use. Each of these constructs plays a role in the user’s willingness
to use the system.
Venkatesh and Davis (2000) identified that usage intentions do supersede the
perceived usefulness and ease of use of mandatory systems in their model of TAM2
which extends TAM. TAM and TAM2 become foundational work for UTAUT and are
factors in the consideration of behavior when assessing clinician decision making to share
passwords.
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Literature Review
Albarrak (2012) has identified that the behaviors of nurses when handling
passwords include sharing of information, exchanging passwords, ignoring logoff
procedures, and allowing for lack of secure procedures in other aspects, which place the
organization at risk for breach. Organizations face the risk of security breach and must
be aware of internal violations that create this situation (Chopra, 2013). The business
management problem is that there is a documented and known need for IT security within
the healthcare environment and that the RN maintains IT security, but current literature
does not address the perception of the RN users maintaining responsibility for and proper
application of IT security as part of their professional role.
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore the perceptions of the
RN within the constructs of the unified theory of acceptance and usage of technology
(UTAUT) as described by Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, and Davis (2003). The relationship
of the UTAUT four constructs performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social
influence, and facilitating conditions aligned with the research design and aspects of the
study specific to security behavior of the employee. Each of these is specific to use
behavior. Additional purposeful outcomes of this study are expected to include
development of a framework for reducing barriers in security practices that are necessary
within the RN workflow, decreasing risk of protected health information release, and
decreasing security breach for the organization by providing knowledge areas for
improvement to the overall security practice.
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Information Security in Healthcare
Previous healthcare research related to information security is scarce, so other
specialties and categories of literature analysis are included within this review
encompassing general and specific aspects of information security not related to
healthcare. There is expansive literature related to HIPAA but the focus of security for
this study relates to the electronic environment in which databases of information allow
clinical employees access. The implementation of the electronic health record thwarted
efforts to enhance security with a range of oversight policies from categories of
organizational to governmental (McGonigle & Mastrian 2015). Healthcare organizations
worked diligently to implement electronic health records as incentivized dollars became
available from the government. Healthcare organizations faced growing technology
infrastructure and associated growing needs for maintaining information security plans
and strategies for maintaining their systems. The development of information security
through regulation and culture began to affect the way those healthcare organizations and
their employees relate to the concept of security.
Before 2004, there was concern within the United States about the coordination of
medical information and the ability to move toward an electronic platform to house
medical information and data (Sochalski & Weiner, 2011). Decision making related to
the movement of electronic medical records became a legislative agenda item and moved
to the federal government. The migration of paper charts to electronic health records
within 10 years became a forefront issue with the healthcare industry challenged by
President George W. Bush’s administration in 2004 to make this become a reality (Kirby,
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2015). This challenge to become electronic included the sharing of a patient’s
documented medical history throughout the patient care continuum no matter where
delivering care occurred. Medical information being maintained by IT systems became a
point of conversation in the American household as much as in the healthcare arena.
When the economic stimulus package was signed into legislation as part of the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 there was a creation of a new vision
for expansion of health IT (Sochalski & Weiner, 2011). This act is the driving force
behind what most healthcare providers know as meaningful use.
The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act
(HITECH) Act is an important part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.
Essential components of HITECH include certified electronic health record technology
that meets governmental standards, enterprise integration that links all healthcare
providers to enable information exchange, and qualified electronic health records to
handle all necessary information needs to provide healthcare related needs (Graham,
2010, Kwon & Johnson, 2012, McGonigle & Mastrian, 2015). HITECH has aimed to
improve healthcare quality, reduced costs due to inadequacies, improved overall health,
facilitated future care through research, and secured a realm to house patient information.
HITECH and healthcare leaders’ focuses maintain alignment towards the same goals and
visions (McGonigle & Mastrian 2015). The implementation of this program began the
incentive for healthcare systems to make a substantial investment in the implementation
of IT systems that would maintain patient information and data.
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The introduction of meaningful use along with the HITECH legislation by the
federal government occurred in 2009 as a part of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act. Healthcare organizations are “scurrying to select decisively,
implement, enhance, or measure the care impact of electronic health records so they may
achieve the meaningful use criteria” (Murphy, 2011, p. 153). Meeting the meaningful
use criteria allows for the qualification of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
Incentive payments. The incentive payments allow for continued support of the
healthcare infrastructure.
Regulatory compliance in IT is a factor that influences the governance of the
management and operations in all businesses. When applied to the healthcare industry
there are not only the aspects of IT governance but also the overlapping health IT
governance including HIPAA and HITECH. Project planning incorporates security
practice in healthcare from the point of plan development through implementation and
adoption. The security practices and regulatory compliance of such within the healthcare
industry is a segment of manageable practice. Several regulatory agencies provide
guidance and oversite related to the security of healthcare practice and management.
These regulatory agencies include the US Department of Health and Human Services
regulations, HITECH, HIPAA, and state regulations. Kwon and Johnson (2012) reported
that there is varying compliance in security practice within the healthcare industry due to
differing interpretations of the guidance and written compliance directives.
Safeguarding, auditing, HR management, and third party security management were the
four types of security practices identified as used when reviewing the organizations that
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maintained high levels of security leaders (Kwon & Johnson, 2014). Within their
research, the authors found that the hospitals with high rankings in the adoption of
security practice and compliance with the technical aspects still varied in the application
of practice. The authors believed this variation was a result of the adoption of policy and
procedure and to what level that infusion into the organization occurred. This
representation of necessity for technical and non-technical solution adoption done
simultaneously is paramount.
For most individuals, healthcare providers, and administrators, the aspects of
security include the electronic medical record and aspects of HIPAA, but they do not
often think of the operational systems and management objectives that are required to
secure the systems and tools used to house and access information. The IT security
system not only for patient information but also for organizational information is large
and complex including but not limited to, servers, data warehouses, networks, Internet,
intranet, multiple vendor clinical products (both hardware and software), and the most
commonly thought of for accessioning devices such as PCs. Clinicians within the
healthcare organization, depending on their role and daily functions, each have
workflows and the need for access to gain and or enter information. For all the
previously mentioned components of the system to be protected, those employees who
access the system must be legitimate, and the system must sustain levels of strict security
and privacy. Authentication of the employee is one way of maintaining these objectives
for the system security, and passwords are one way of authenticating. Authentication is
the method of identification or validation that the user is legitimate and may have entry to
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the system for which they are attempting to access resources or services (Milenković,
Latinović, & Simić, 2013, and Rajarajan, Prabhu, Palanivel, & Karthikeyan, 2014). The
healthcare organizations attempt to assure ease of use related to secure practice by
implementing authentication practices using single sign-on (SSO) allowing the user ease
of access to multiple applications. According to Milenković et al. single sign-on allows
the user increased ease of use and decreased time spent authenticating because of the
functionality to authenticate only once and have full use of all systems. With
authentication methods known and established by the organization for employees, it is up
to the employee to carry out the accurate procedure and process for security behavior and
management.
Another aspect of employee interaction with IT security is the use of devices.
Koivunen, Niemi, and Hupli (2014) demonstrated in the study of health professionals
using communication devices that barriers prevent correct processes toward security and
tools for best outcomes are not always present even if the user wants to use secure
practices. Healthcare organizations are accountable for security practices of the
employees and with this study, Koiven et al. (2014) identified that healthcare needs more
information to support better the growing field of device management and security.
Leaders of the organizations take responsibility for overseeing the IT security
programs from all aspects of development, implementation, and evaluation to assure it is
ongoing and protecting the organization. Often the Chief Information Officer (CIO) is
the individual to lead the organization with focused information related to the
management and oversight of IT security. Landolt, Hirschel, Schlienger, Businger, and
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Zbinden (2012) conducted a study of 112 hospitals in German-speaking Switzerland
gaining information from the CIOs to find if the organizations were compliant with the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) standard ISO/IEC 27002. The study investigated if the standards
implementation was nothing through to complete. Of 51 responding hospitals, there was
a 51.1% score of implementation. Switzerland has an implementation plan suggesting
that the hospitals are facing difficulty in implementation with the standards similarly to
many other countries. Interestingly, the university hospitals have lower percent
compliance than the private hospitals but it was not statistically significant. This study
demonstrates another set of standards and a group of leaders attempting to oversee
security measures for healthcare organizations.
IT security is complex, management of the IT security involves protecting the
network, managing the users, and maintaining the appropriate IT security tools (Kruger &
Anschutz, 2013). In a review of current statistical data conducted by Liu, Chung, Chen,
and Wang (2012), they identified that the healthcare security threats came from the
employees internal to the system in 70% of the cases. These authors identified the
complexity of variables in healthcare that leads to the many factors for potential internal
breach of the system. Box and Pottas (2013) discussed that the general operational
functioning of healthcare professionals is naturally within an honorable and trusting
community culturally implicit of a low threshold for need of security sensitivity.
Unfortunately, this leaves many of the frontline with a limited sense of need for IT
security awareness.
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Enhancements of security are an avenue that continuously develops even as the
basic security measures remain weak or continue development at the same time. Liu et
al. discussed advancing the protection of the medical information using firewalls since
most healthcare organizations now use the internet as part of their regular course of
business. Like Simpson (1996) and Arce (2003), Liu et al. identified the need for internal
users to have knowledge of information security and good practice related to that
experience. Organizational IT security depends on the secure behaviors of all employees.
The healthcare industry uses IT security practices in both the clinical equipment
for patient care and most of the patient information gathering, maintenance, and transfer
within the acute care hospital environment as well as billing and collection. Intranet and
Internet use by the employees are areas of importance for clinical attention similar to all
clinical devices. The intranet is an internal connection for the workstations, personal
computers, clinical devices sharing information, or host systems that are as a group
internally managed in the organization and for internal use (Liu et al., 2012). Firewall
protection separates data used on this internal system from the Internet and maintains a
secure privacy. The internet allows open access between the organization and the
“Internet highway” diminishing security practice thus many healthcare clinical desktops
that use clinical applications including the electronic medical record do not allow open
access, but limited - controlled access, to the Internet. Chen, Nyemba, and Malin (2012)
discuss the predictability of behavior related to the employee handling the medical record
in comparison to social technology computing companies like Twitter. The findings that
they presented included healthcare organizations being stable inclusive of the networks or

39
departments representing the organizations and employees as dynamic in nature. These
findings are positive given the electronic record and the data collected through the record
are constantly transforming. Health information exchange is on the forefront of
advancing communications between clinicians and organizations to improve patient care
while tracking patients and identities (Crawford, 2014). These types of health
intelligence will continue to increase as data driven care continues. Security
requirements will continue to increase as this field grows.
Administrative and management oversight is important in the leadership of
employee engagement with IT security. Alshaikh, Ahmad, Maynard, and Chang (2014)
conducted a review of management activity related to security that was in the literature.
The authors reviewed 284 academic papers and 192 test books to develop a preliminary
taxonomy. The findings of the study included organizations policy management
strategies of building a security team, which may include a security manager, to (a)
implement and manage security, (b) manage information security risk, (c) develop
employee security awareness, (d) maintain documentation of technical controls, and (e)
act as an organizational liaison. The findings from the taxonomy included within each of
the practice areas a guide for assessment, development, implementation, evaluation, and
sustainability. Alshaikh et al. discussed in future research that by omission the literature
did not differentiate practices into managerial or technical categories. The findings, from
the review of organizations with a security team, were positive of which became helpful
to the users.
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Understanding the benchmarks presented in the literature along with best
practices identified in case studies related to the administrative and IT oversight the
importance of employee engagement related to IT security is evident. This is the
foundation for understanding the connection made between the RN role and security
compliance. Applying this literature built a foundation for identifying the construct of
Performance Expectancy and understanding how it plays a role in the RNs usage of the
security practices. According to Venkatesh et al. (2003) within the construct of
performance expectancy, the users find the systems to be useful in their job and helpful in
improving overall productivity.
IT Security
IT security, in general, has a great wealth of information with vast literature
available. Exploration of that literature with application to the health IT security may be
of some benefit. Many of the organizations find similarity in culture, employees, system
management, regulatory compliance, and straddling new technology and approaches to
challenges. Often organizations implement compliance regulations with the intent that all
will be perfect, and it just does not work. There is much more to the story of regulation
and as Kwon and Johnson (2012) points out in his work, there is no correlation between
individual measures and breach performance thus there is no guarantee to security
performance.
Technical aspects of IT security include managing software and hardware,
devices communications, wireless, intranet, internet, and system access technologies.
Identity management is one example of a system that is managed by IT security. Single
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sign-on, an identity management system that allows for authentication to multiple
applications, is widely used in corporate environments. Milenković et al. discuss that the
identity management system solves the problem of users having to create and remember
multiple passwords that would most likely cause the creation of insecure passwords,
forgetting passwords, or wasting time with multiple authentications. Organizations
overseeing the authentication process must consider the system use for the single sign-on
authentication. All users with multiple applications will most likely use the functionality
creating desired participation and required security oversight. Password and biometric
authentication are both methods of gaining access to systems securely. Li, Wen, Li,
Zhang, and Jin (2014) discuss that the biometric authentication scheme protects
information security and privacy.
Practices that improve culture must involve the employees and organizational
stakeholders to change security culture alike (Gaunt, 2000, & Kwon & Johnson, 2014).
The culture of an organization influences responses to IT security. Kwon and Johnson
(2014) demonstrated in his work that there were three levels of security practice adoption
based on culture, leaders, followers, and laggers. Those identified organizations noted as
leaders were training and managing risk and breach incidents.
Human factors are frequently mentioned in the literature when discussing IT
security and often through history have been referred to as the weakest link (Arce, 2003,
Tam et al., 2010, and Ferguson et al., 2011). Kwon and Johnson (2014) discuss that the
healthcare industry faces two weak links the internal threat and the external threat.
Because healthcare has not adequately ramped up to deal with the security risks through
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investment, remainders exist of uncertainty related to coping with the two weak links.
Evaluating and managing the human factors is one of the key aspects of IT security.
Negligence is often cited as a human factor that affects the organization. Negligence can
fall into several categories of security risk. Kruger and Anschutz (2013) discussed the
insider negligence at the root of data breaches. They discussed the false sense of security
that everyone inside is safe but outsiders find ways in and not all insiders are honest
(Kruger & Anschutz, 2013). Security related behavior is an ever-pressing topic related to
overall IT security. The employees’ behavior must be reviewed and understood within
the organization so that there is an opportunity to delineate risk behaviors. Once
delineated, the behavior must be addressed in a manner that will be corrective. A vigilant
program will increase employee IT security awareness.
Nurses Awareness of Security
Review of the literature revealed the limited field of work written related to
awareness of IT security by the end user. Most of the employee IT awareness
information is imbedded in the IT education and IT policy literature or is inferred within
implementation of IT project literature. Documentation in the literature about the
knowledge of handling IT security is limited. As the focus narrows toward IT awareness
of nurses, the literature available is increasingly sparse. Direct awareness of IT security
is often targeting the nurses’ awareness and concern for privacy during the use of
technology in regards to communicating patient information. In studying factors
effecting compliance of IT security, Harris and Furnell (2012) discuss that the employees
of organizations have been found to have only moderate to low awareness when asked
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about behaviors required for security compliance. Albarrak (2012) who studied the
population of nurses identified that the nurses were deficient in security awareness and
the importance of overall IT security in relation to patient data. However, Albarrak was
able to identify that the nurses had a 92% awareness of the need for password
authentication when accessing the electronic system for patient information. Harris and
Furnell (2012) and Albarrak’s (2012) findings are both contrary to what Koivunen,
Niemi, and Hupli (2014) identified in their study of nursing professional’s experience
using communication devices in that nurses had a concern for information security during
the use of such devices and expressed awareness as they relayed barriers of use. There
was no description within any of the three studies as to the reason for the state of IT
security awareness. One may be able to consider the point of evaluation for awareness as
the study that identified IT security awareness involved devices that were used with
points of contact and consideration in the midst of patient information sharing as opposed
to initiating and ending a session for access to a system.
Insight into human behavior and intention gives clues to awareness as described
by Yoon and Kim (2013) and reveals employee characteristics maintaining IT security.
Within their study, the findings described that behavioral intention is a key variable in IT
security awareness. Discussion included that the individuals’ beliefs of protection from
being part of an organization that provides security is important to maintaining security.
Ifinedo (2012) discussed that the by holding a regular IT security awareness campaign
managers will increase presence with the employees and be shaping the future security
behaviors of the employees.
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Policy and Penalty
Literature from Simpson (1996), Gaunt (2000), and others more than 15 years
ago, identified the lack of personal and professional responsibility by users to follow
policies for information and system IT security. The following education and policy
literature review covers aspects of organizational and employee response and interaction
to IT security policy, strengthening of policy and procedure within the healthcare
organization, IT involvement in education and policy, and recommendations made for the
education and consequence of staff associated with IT security measures.
Simpson (1996) discussed that a lack of policy and procedure, education, and
oversight from leadership within the organizations allows for breaches in the security. IT
leadership, healthcare organizations, and orientation programs have made strong attempts
to address many of the issues that Simpson had discussed in the 90’s. Gaunt (2000)
discussed the need for training to increase awareness. There are many aspects to security
policy compliance related to the human factor with one of the first being awareness
(Belanger, 2011; Renaud, & Goucher, 2012; Vance, Lowry, & Eggett, (2013); & Barlow,
Warkentin, Ormond, & Dennis, (2013). An employee must first be aware of a policy
before being able to follow that policy. Renaud and Goucher (2012) reaffirm that it is
unlikely that the employees will read policies without encouragement, so it takes
management interaction, education, and oversight to assure that the employee gets the
information. Following awareness, there are several other strategies that an organization
would employ.
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Belanger (2011) found that attitudes regarding policy implementation for security
were not affected based on knowledge of consequence even if there was a known
consequence and the breach was severe. A secondary finding revealed that technical
competence had a relationship to a decrease in policy enhancement, which Belanger
concluded might be due to the mandatory aspects of change thus impacting pride. When
mandatory processes are implemented, the individual is placed in a challenged position
and with competence being questioned a negative attitude may develop.
Through the years, many different strategies have risen as implementation
solutions for organizations including one of consequence. Consequences causing
workforce employee fear of not following the rules is an effective measure of successful
implementation as reported by Workman, Bommer, and Straub, (2009). In a field, study
focused on individual and organizational factors Workman et al. (2009) used survey and
observation to gather data and conduct an analysis of that data using exploratory factor
analysis. The factor analysis led to high congruence between the self-reported data and
the observation data thus z-score was applied. Predictive amplification of procedural
justice was applied to all hypotheses in the study resulting in a conclusion that the
security focus was on either the individual or the organization factors but not on both.
When individuals believe the threat is high and is directly expected to influence them
personally, they will respond by supporting policy much more than if the threat is
perceived as distant. Findings related to procedural justice were important in this study
when the organizational processes supported justice related to employee concerns or
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grievances and management addressed them there was a 20% increase in security
behaviors.
Guo, Yuan, Archer, and Connelly (2011) identified that misuse of organizational
information security policies without malicious intent to cause harm is the definition of a
non-malicious security violation. Based on this definition, Guo (2013) identified
behaviors of security violation that include (a) intentional, (b) nonmalicious selfbenefitting, (c) voluntary rule breaking, and (d) possibly causing damage or security risk.
Considering each of these behaviors as undesirable, Guo (2013) discusses the
multifaceted approaches to the resolution of security risk. He suggests additional
literature including deterrence with a focus on prevention, punishment, contingency
factors, neutralization, and relative advantage in job performance.
Yoon and Kim (2013) examined the practices of 162 employees of Korean
organizations to identify a model for analyzing employees’ workplace related computer
security behaviors. Yoon and Kim identified that the moral obligation and attitude
toward computer security are predictors of individual employee’s intention to practice
computer security behavior. The identified model aligns with the UTAUT model as it
prescribes similar tracts leading to behavior and use. Interestingly, this study brought the
concept of moral obligation into the realm of a security behavior rather than an ethical
issue, which allowed this examination to take place as a self-control measure. This
measure of moral obligation contributed to the social norms as a positive deviant to
security behavior. Ifinedo (2014) suggested in the findings from his study that
management providing atmospheres where employees could share organizational values
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through socialization with fellow workers could increase security compliance.
Gajanayake, Shame, and Lane (2013) described an information accountability system that
allows for minimizing risk if the proper governmental regulations are in place. This is
done through instruments of measuring evaluation of protocol coupled with user context.
It is based on user awareness and actual user adoption. Gajanayake et al. (2013)
evaluated this method of accountability on an eHealth system allowing for the variance of
healthcare information, personnel, and patients.
Agaku, Adisa, Ayo-Yusuf, and Connolly (2014), Kim, Yang, and Park (2014),
and Umphress, and Bingham (2011) each discussed the behavioral aspects of employee
compliance with security policy and organizational protocol providing varying reasons
for behaviors. Agaku et al. (2014) identified that employees are willing to take measures
of security with protected health information but do not easily make the connection to
other security measures that encompass and protect the system housing the patient’s
medical records. Kim et al. (2014) demonstrated that there is a relationship between the
belief of security policy effectiveness and policy compliance, thus the higher the trust in
the security policy the higher compliance with the policy. Conversely, Umphress and
Bingham (2011) identified that there may be developed unethical pro-organizational
behavior that influences culture in which the employees believe they are protecting the
organization by purposefully violating the policies. Because the actions are seen as
protecting the organization it is overlooked and becomes a cultural norm. These
unethical acts although violating policy and procedure are seen as doing bad for good
reasons by the employee and the employment social group with outcomes that lead to
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risk. The relationships are complex and warrant further research. This concept of
neutralization is violating policy but believing it is for the good of the organization is
justifying the reason for violation of policy. The justification or rationalization may
occur in many forms as the employee moves through the process of violation. Barlow et
al. (2013), Kim et al. (2014), and Umphress and Bingham (2014) all concluded that
neutralization is prevalent with in the employee base and requires training to raise
awareness. Barlow et al. (2013) discussed that based on neutralization, employees will
violate policies even with the knowledge that there are deterrent policies in place
suggesting that they rationalize the deterrence consequence. Healthcare providers often
justify the work they do finding applications to patient care. Thus, neutralization may be
a plausible application to the clinical personnel when applying security principles to the
clinical workflow.
Agaku et al. (2014), Kim et al. (2014), Yoon et al. (2013), and Umphress and
Bingham (2011) all subscribed to the necessity of training for information security so that
when the employee is faced with the security situation, no questions arise, the process of
knowing what and how to take measures of protecting the system is second nature. In
this situation, the employee knows the policy, has practiced, and will be without a risk of
security breach. Training includes basic security knowledge, policy awareness,
neutralization awareness, and communication methods (Barlow et al., 2013, and Renaud
et al., 2012). The education and communication processes are foundational knowledge
for the implementation and sustainment of policy and protocol knowledge related to
information security. Barlow et al. (2013) and Kim et al. (2014) discouraged
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neutralization to reduce IT policy violation. Although the education is not a single factor
of success toward security maintenance, it is required so that there is a basic level of
understanding by employees for performance expectation. Several methods of
communicating basic knowledge including policy introduction to employees at the point
of entry to the organization on orientation is accomplished during the following; annual
competency review periods, information review of policies, and during regular
communication rollouts within the organization. Once provided education reaches the
employees’, engagement in the security process is elicited and is best incorporated into
the performance expectation. Vance, Lowry, and Eggett (2013) recommend
accountability processes for the reduction of access policy violations. Within the study,
(a) monitoring awareness, (b) auditing, (c) engaging in approved actions, and (d)
emulating social presence were four aspects of positive influence toward accountability
(Vance et al., 2013). Accountability means that the employee is responsible for the
security but they must also be empowered to care for the security of the organization,
meaning they need to have the correct knowledge and tools. If the employees can view
the responsibility of security as shared, they will adjust along with management staff
when supported to appropriately uphold the security efforts of the organization (Renauld
et al., 2012).
Another look at consequences for human motivation related to rule following in
the realm of information security is punishment or reward. Son (2011) and Ifinedo
(2012) explored variables of intrinsic motivation and motivation theory and how they
relate to security compliance. In contrast, Harris and Furnell (2012) explored shaming
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and the impact that it had on behavior and awareness toward security compliance.
Shaming was found to be impactful because it outweighed the act itself and the employee
was aware of the wrongdoing. If the employee was not aware of the wrongdoing, then
the shaming was not effective and created a negative perception of IT. The negative
perception of IT becomes counterproductive to the efforts of building relationships and
communication pathways. The most concerning and severe report of shaming by the
employees was when an employee’ name and a photo was placed publicly for the rest of
the peer group to see. An example given was a posting within the break room. The
employees felt as though the shaming sanctions were harsh and they did respond but
Harris and Furnell (2012) cautioned that the risks of alienating staff from information
security staff and ideas might be detrimental to overall efforts. The study by Son (2011)
demonstrated that there is a lack of attention toward the intrinsic motivation of human
behavior. Provided managers connect with internal values of employees, stronger
connections toward security compliance would occur. Ultimately, alienation through
shaming would not be the ideal in creating connections.
Leaders and top management in the organization are individuals that influence the
cycle of information security compliance. Hu, Dinev, Hart, and Cooke (2012) explored
the aspects of leadership, culture of the organization, and the employee behavior. The
findings included that the top management has a critical role significantly affecting the
organizational culture and employee beliefs. Organizational culture has a significant
effect on employee attitudes. It is important that top management is helping to form the
culture of security for and along with the employee. Box and Pottas (2013) suggested
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that the actions must be taken to promote positive attitudes along with the policy
implementations toward IT security behavior. This will only be accomplished through
the motivational properties of emotion.
Facilitating Conditions as perceived by the RN, include the technical methods that
support the RN in using the security practices. Within the construct of facilitating
conditions, the user believes they have resources and knowledge required to use the
system, they determine if it is compatible with other systems that they use, and they have
someone to assist them when needed (Venkatesh et al., 2003). Within this study,
exploration of RN perceptions of security practice facilitation through the conditions of
technical approaches is expected to have a direct correlation.
Throughout this section of security related policy and associated behaviors, the
patterns of password management by employees and risk of breach are additional areas of
literature that impact the foundational work for this study in framing the business
problem. Compliance with the security practice continues to be anecdotally reported in
the popular business and healthcare literature and captured along with the reports of the
security breaches as they occur. The business management problem continues to exist
because there is a lack of research and insight into how breaches and violations of the
security occur.
Password Management
Maintaining the security of the IT system within any organization must focus on
the employees who access the system. Protecting access to the system is most frequently
accomplished through password authentication (Albarrak, 2012; Belanger, 2011; Cazier
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& Medlin, 2006; Rajarajan, Prabhu, Palanivel, & Karthikeyan, 2014; Sharma, &
Sugumaran, 2011; and Tam, Glassman, & Vandenwauver, 2010). From an
organizational perspective, the IT system is composed of three parts, technology,
management, and the people (Cheng, Li, Li, Holm, & Zhai, 2013). The people or
employees remain the weakest link in security and password management even though
there have been strides in technology systems (Medlin et al., 2008; & Tam et al., 2010).
According to Sharma and Sugumaran (2011) a clear understanding of the asset and the
value of such asset is required for a company to create the policies and changes around
the process to ensure adequate security including employee practices. A review of
literature related to password practices is presented in this section and demonstrates the
interrelatedness to behaviors or violations of IT security literature.
Reviewing the history of passwords, Cheswick (2013) discusses the Green Book
that the U.S. government published in the 1980’s providing advice for passwords and
avoiding threats against technology. Cheswick (2013) makes comparisons from the
1980’s with today identifying how the paradigm has shifted noting that there are very
different password creation methods for protecting the security. An example provided is
that in the 1980’s it was a general rule of thumb not to ever write a password down but to
create a password you would remember because the threat was that someone at the office
or in your desk area was the threat of theft. Today the threat is remote and can access the
computer system from miles or countries away so creating a strong password that you
may not remember except for writing it down is much less of a threat. Cheswick (2013)
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suggests ways to remember the password by writing phrases that will help you remember
it without actually writing the password down thus making it even more secure.
Measures to protect IT security involve a vast array of security aspects, which
include the hardware and software applications used by employees (Crazier et al. 2006;
Medlin et al., 2008, & Rajarajan et al., 2014). Even though the aspects associated with
security fall within the scope of IT security, they require operational management and
oversight. One particular measure of the security management in healthcare is the
maintenance of password confidentiality and security (Cazier & Medlin, 2006, and
Medlin et al., 2008).
To understand the population of employees that will be included in this study, a
brief summary is provided here. There are 3,972,327 professionally active registered
nurses in the U.S. (KFF, 2015). According to Charles, Gabriel, and Furukawa (2014,
May) there are currently 94% of hospitals with basic electronic health record adoption
and 59.4% with certified electronic health record adoption. Between 2008 and 2014,
there has been a two-fold increase in electronic health record adoption by office-based
physicians (ONC, 2015). Provided the governmental incentives described earlier remain
in place these numbers will continue to rise creating few environments remaining for a
nurse to practice without accessing an electronic medical record and IT system. Within
the workforce of healthcare today, 37.4% of all hospital labor costs are comprised of RN
labor (Welton, 2011). Because the employee base is comprised of a large portion of RNs
who are using the technology applications for multiple purposes, it is important to
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identify their knowledge related to the implications and consequences of the security risk
and breach.
Albarrak (2012), Fernández-Alemán et al. (2015), and Medlin et al. (2008)
identified that the behaviors associated with password practices allowed for password
sharing. Albarrak (2012) identified that nurses mishandled the passwords through
sharing their information, exchanging the passwords, and ignoring the need for the
password resets. Fernández-Alemán et al. (2015) discussed that sharing of passwords
among healthcare employees who responded to the password security questions identified
that they shared passwords. A review of security scoring was done to evaluate
relationships between education level, work experience, professional category, and
gender of which none were significant for the sharing of passwords. Medlin et al. (2008)
concluded that the employees did not view the IT security aspect of password
management as important. Albarrak (2012) reported the password sharing at a rate of
33%, Fernández-Alemán et al. (2015) at a rate of 31.7 %, and Medlin et al. (2008) at a
rate of 73%. In these three studies, sharing of passwords occurred with coworkers or
colleagues and friends of their coworkers. Reasons for sharing were not described.
Developing and managing a password was discussed by Albarrak (2012),
Belanger (2011), and Medlin et al. (2008) identifying that users had knowledge of how to
create a strong password but did not choose to do so when an easier to remember
alternative could be used. Belanger (2011) described this user preference as “ease of
use”. This path of ease is the avenue that most users will default toward when
developing their passwords if left to their own devices. Medlin et al. (2008) identifies
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that memorization of passwords is not practical or effective as the short-term memory is
not capable of holding such if it is correctly crafted. Often the lack of ability to
memorize the difficult password is what leads to the easy password creating those that are
then easy to guess making the system vulnerable to risk. Medlin et al. (2008) identified
that most users’ passwords fell into four primary categories that were previously defined,
Family, Fan, Fantasists, Cryptic and the four expanded groups of Other, Faith, Place, and
Numbers. The password categories are each briefly defined in Figure 2.

Category

Definition

Family

Name or nickname, name of child, partner or pet, birthday

Fan

Faith

Names of athletes, singers, movie stars, fictional characters or sports
teams
Evidence of sex is evident in passwords such as “sexy” “stud” and
“goddess”
Unintelligible passwords or a random string of letters, numbers and
symbols
Common English dictionary terms that did not include religious terms or
places
Terms associated with religion or religious terms or places

Place

Names associated with towns or cities

Numbers

A string of all numbers

Fantasists
Cryptic
Other

Figure 2. Primary and expanded password categories and definitions. Adapted from
Analyzing the vulnerability of U.S. hospitals to social engineering attacks: How many of
your employees would share their password? by Medlin, B., Cazier, J., & Foulk, D.
(2008). International Journal of Information Security and Privacy, 2(3), p. 74-75.
Medlin et al., (2008) did make a correlation in findings that those who made
stronger passwords were less willing to share their passwords (29%) than those who

56
included family in the password who were willing to share at 60% and those who
included numbers at 50%. Along with categories of password creation findings of
password strength or complexity is identified. According to Crazier et al. (2006), the
password should be complex to create the secure environment and maintain the password
as the protective gatekeeper to the patient information. The complex password definition
includes a combination of at least eight characters with a mix of upper and lower case
letters and at least one special character (Crazier et al., 2006). Tam et al. (2010)
identified that even if there was intent to create a complex password it does not lead to a
password that is better. Albarrak (2012) had no nurse create a strong password that
would meet the definition of complex. Another issue that Albarrak (2012) explored with
nurses was them changing the password once they were aware that others knew the
password and 54% responded that they would not. Along with the previous concerns of
password management, a paralleled aspect of security management is computer log-off.
Albarrak (2012) identified that 16% of the nurses studied did not log off of the system
they were working with, allowing for others to access confidential information under
their authentication, again representing a lack of understanding or connection with IT
security.
Tam et al. (2010) and Cheswick (2013) discussed that the issues surrounding
password management are related to the human factors and that people will trade
convenience for the security. Even though password knowledge is present, Tam et al.
found that users were more concerned about family and friends gaining information than
that threat of hacking or identity theft. Tam et al.’s (2010) findings regarding password
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selection showed that users were able to understand a passwords quality but often chose a
weak password because it was more convenient basing this on the concept of the
influence of a near event versus the likelihood of a future event. The example provided is
the protection from a future event such as identity theft versus the current event
remembering my password (Tam et al., 2010).
Social Influence is the method by which the RN perceives others, such as their
peers or significant other important professionals in the clinical environment, believe they
should be using the security practices. Within the construct of social influence, the user
believes that their use of the system is influential to others and others that are important
think that it should be used, the business leaders believe it should be used, and the
organization supports the system use (Venkatesh et al., 2003). Within this study, the RN
perceptions of social influence are an important aspect within the clinical setting related
to varying levels of social support that may or may not permit sharing of passwords,
mishandling of passwords, and other security issues such as no log-off.
Workflow
In an examination of the workflow of those employees that work directly with the
patient population in acute healthcare settings and those that support them in the work
that they perform, all employees have a responsibility to maintain IT security within the
scope of the work duties (Renaud, & Goucher, 2012). Several themes and
recommendations related to the workflow were present in the literature.
Recommendation for structure and system enhancement of the workflow and
environment presented a potential resolution of current issues and continuing errors
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(Alsalamah, Gray, Hilton, & Alsalamah, 2013, Kraemer & Carayon, 2006, and
Schwartze, Haarbrandt, Formeier, Haux, & Seidel, 2014). Alsalamah et al. (2013)
discussed the aspect of patient-centered care, collaboration, and decision-making and the
impact of the workflow on the medical information following an observational
methodology study that analyzed cancer pathways. The study focused on the legacy
systems with case management as the population. Findings from the observation
revealed the need for open information creating a difficult situation for maintaining
security. Alsalamah et al. identified six themes necessary for security; (a) Role-based
access control, need to know basis for access to information; (b) Fine-grained access
control, different positions gain varying levels of access to information; (c) Circle of
trust, allowing members with specific levels of access to gain emergent access in specific
circumstances “breaking the glass” (p. 814); (d) Persistent control, continually maintain
the ability to track information flow by user throughout the life of the records; (e)
Dynamic control, the ability to change security and protection levels; and (f) Humanlevel policy awareness, share policies with users related to level of access and protection.
Schwartze et al. (2014) conducted research to find an applicable authentication method
for clinical workflows through a systematic literature review. Within this literature
review, Schwatze et al. (2014) identified that the system and the user allowed for risk
when focused on the clinical requirements specific to workflow. An example of
workflow concern is the login sessions that were not logged out allowing for another to
gain access. This lack of logging out, either intentional or unintentional is both a system
and user issue but not readily resolved by any additional security implementation. In all
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cases of plans for correction, this is nothing more than adding security to an insecure
workflow. The conclusion reached within this review was that the username and
password combination is the most practical and secure authentication solution in the
clinical workflow process (Schwatze et al., 2014).
Each clinical discipline has a workflow that is unique unto itself including tasks
and interventions based on knowledge and expertise within their field of clinical practice.
The clinical workflow for the RN includes each of the following: The pattern of RN
work in time and motion as it relates to (a) patient care, assessment, medication
administration, patient information communication and documentation, (b) charge nurse
and preceptor duties, (c) incorporation of clinical devices and technology including the
electronic medical record, and (d) other work of the clinical environment as carried out
by the RN as part of an assignment responsibility according to policy and procedure or
protocol / practice (Kashiwagi, Sexton, Graves, Johnson, Callies, Roger, & Thompson,
2016, Koloroutis, 2004, and Zheng, Haftel, Hirschl, O'Reilly, & Hanauer, 2010). While
employees have IT security aspects within the scope of responsibility for their profession
and job descriptions, it is identified in the literature that they do not identify a working
implementation of that responsibility within the workflow of the duties they perform.
Gunawan (2016) discussed the basic concepts to electronic health records being used in
nursing practice and the attributes such as ease of use, user friendly, and good
performance coinciding with the workflow. Workarounds are a possible outcome of
technology implementation and was identified by Rack, Dudjak, and Wolf (2012), who
concluded that it should be easier to use the technology that is being implemented than to
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develop a workaround. The environment and work should support the technology
implementation. Zafar, Ko, and Clark, (2014) in a healthcare case study discussed that
the clinical staff does not see the IT security as being part of the clinical work. They
identify that the clinical staff were busy with clinical patient care and duties related to
patient management thus maintaining a perception of the IT security being separate,
different, and nonclinical. This qualitative study identified many issues of IT security
within the clinical workflow that inhibit the process of accurate use and inclusion of IT
security. The perception of the clinical professionals was that they did not have time to
incorporate or “worry about” the IT security (Zafar et al., 2014, p. 743). Zafar et al.
(2014) discussed the importance of executive management support and empowerment of
the team so that IT security becomes a part of the workflow. Engagement of leadership
within the organization is critical.
Clinical leadership, decision making, and overall success of the healthcare
institution is determined at the executive level by a group of individuals, the Chief
Medical Officer (CMO), the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and the Chief Nursing
Officer (CNO). This group must work closely with the Chief Information Officer (CIO)
and the Chief Nursing Information Officer (CNIO) to coordinate the electronic medical
record and data maintenance of the organization. The CNO and CNIO work in close
collaboration with all levels of nursing leadership including the informatics teams and
clinical departments to ensure proper flow, management, usage, and functionality are
conducted. The CNO and CNIO also work closely with the CMO, CIO, and CEO to
ensure and maintain accountability for the organization as being financially responsible
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for the care provided, the technology used, and patient outcomes (Hebda, & Czar, 2013;
Hovenga, & Grain, 2013). Leaders are responsible for creating change but in particular
the nursing leader creates a platform for change in nursing practice. Salmela, Eriksson,
and Fagerstrom (2012) reported that the knowledge of nurse leadership methods of
leading change is through relating, translating, and transforming practice by the roles they
play in the change processes. Change requires a continuous learning and reshaping
within the organizational culture. Thought patterns restructuring, reshaping of ideas, and
movement of change in opinion and value is the basis for the creation of genuine change.
Change becomes important as implementation and sustainment of IT security are at the
forefront of leadership and organizational goals.
Nurse executives are also prepared in the knowledge of nursing operation at the
bedside and in the strategic vision of the healthcare system while moving the informatics
implementation into the clinical environment to foster the best patient care and outcome.
The nurse executive has to conceptually and operationally know both sides, the clinical
plan of bedside care and the vision of the organizational mission, vision, and goals. They
become the most knowledgeable of the executive leadership team from a global
perspective when integrating informatics within the institution. Sockolow, Rogers,
Bowles, Hand, and George (2014) discussed many of the important facets of nurse
executive’s communications and considerations for implementation and maintenance of
technology and software to assure success. They describe the nurse executive role as
critical to interacting with the nurse in decision making and using evidence based systems
to combat hurdles faced with technology. One of the nurse executive competencies is
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that they are a to be a progressive thinker who can predict and/or anticipate the future of
nursing practice and the needs that come along with the transitions in practice; this places
them in the category of an early adopter of the electronic record and other devices within
the healthcare world. As a nurse leader founder of nursing and the first nurse executive,
Florence Nightingale documented patient care to track a patient’s progress (Kirby, 2015).
During the Crimean War, Florence Nightingale considered the patients’ needs, projected
the best way to meet those needs, and recorded them in patient notes.
Effort Expectancy is associated with how easy it is to use the security practices.
Ease of use is determined within the workflow. Within the construct of effort
expectancy, the user finds the system to help with clear communication, improve system
skill, create ease of system use and make learning easy (Venkatesh et al., 2003). When
IT security is part of the workflow and is helpful to clinical care employees are more
likely to include the associated behaviors required to carry the security measures out
fully.
Risk and Breach
Organizational protection and overall risk management are impacted by the level
of security maintenance by every employee. Behaviors that are employed with the use of
passwords and the security practices may correlate with the description by Kruger and
Anschutz (2013) discussing the access to the electronic patient health information gained
either maliciously or nonmaliciously within the organizations. These behaviors and
variant accessing of systems as described may be one cause for healthcare to be leading
in data breaches as recorded in 2011 among the top 10 industries (Kruger & Anschutz,
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2013). IT improvements help to create major advances in the healthcare sector providing
improved quality with advances in medical science and reductions in costs, but the down
side is increased violation of the security and privacy (Appari & Johnson 2010).
Healthcare organizations are increasingly becoming the targets of hacking in the same
manner as sought after personal information. Public awareness and concern of hacking
are becoming more prominent (Kwon & Johnson, 2014).
The majority of this section will focus on the threat of a system breach due to an
unauthorized access of the system or an intrusion of some type to gain information
without permissions. I would, however, be remiss if I did not mention the concept of
systemic threat that some patients experience. According to Appari and Johnson, (2010)
the systemic threat is a threat to patient privacy from those within the organization who
are legally accessing the information and using it to the patient’s detriment. Examples of
systemic threat include using medical information to deny health or life insurance, deny
employment, or creating other burdensome financial hardships (Appari & Johnson 2010).
Although this threat exists, the focus of threat for the purpose of this literature review will
be toward a security breach.
Employee awareness of policy related to IT security is an important aspect of
organizational IT security and protection from a breach. There is a great deal of literature
related to IT security policy implementation and compliance yet there is little agreement
in the literature about what creates compliance and overall organizational security. IT
security policy awareness is the individual awareness of the consequences of failing to
comply with the organizational security policies (Rotvold, 2008). Security practice is the
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behavior the nurses use to maintain the security or not, by properly authenticating and
maintaining the security of their accounts to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of data (Chopra, 2013). Security risk is influenced by the security practice
and is defined as a threat that the password privacy or another access to the account has
exposure of a kind including a violation during use due to deviation from policy,
protocol, or practice, that has allowed for the threat of harm potentially rendering the
system no longer secure (Rotvold, 2008). This process of security deviation allows for
breach and renders the organizations system vulnerable to breach from the inside.
The average breach, usually tracked to an insider rather than a malicious hacker,
costs an organization approximately $6 million or more for each incident according to the
Ponemon Institute (“Cyber Attacks”, 2015 & “State of Cybersecurity”, 2015). After a
surge in healthcare breaches that creates exposure of data for millions of patients, the cost
was reported for 2014 by Eddy (2014) to be $5.6 Billion and currently after a five-year
study is now reported to cost over $6 Billion (“Cyber Attacks”, 2015). Personal
information security has become progressively more important with increased public
awareness that has been heightened for multiple reasons including increased reporting
within the public-sector news reports. People are more affected than ever with numbers
increasing over five years from 1.4 to 2.3 million adult victims of medical identity theft
(“Cyber Attacks”, 2015). The investigative report published by O'Harrow (2012)
identified the many vulnerabilities of IT security occurring within the healthcare industry.
These included password mishandling, insecure practices, known security access issues
that were left unaddressed and wireless device access points that were insecure leaving
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the organization open for risk of security breach or inappropriate access to the system.
Ponemon Institute reports in their whitepapers that the top reasons for healthcare breach
remain employee negligence with lost and stolen devices (Eddy, 2014 & “Criminal
Attacks”, 2015).
Chopra (2013) discusses controls required for hospital security of which one
category is technical and includes seven aspects, (a) filtering of web traffic, (b) e-mail
server filters with removal of malicious attachments, (c) patching procedures or
automatic patching, (d) anti-virus, (e) controlled PCs and hardware, (f) encrypted storage
devices, and (g) restrictive firewalls. If these measures are in place then the other
measures such as support services for security access, technical controls to allow for
access between groups, security teams dedicated to specific work and response, and
management team members that are responsive to IT security will all supplement a
successful security program (Chopra, 2013).
With the recent hacking of Anthem, one of the United States largest Health
Insurers, the American people are even more aware of vulnerabilities regarding personal
information and health information (Abelson & Goldstein, 2015). Information from
approximately 80 million records was available to the hackers once they hacked into the
Anthem system. A phishing scam was used to access the credentials of five employees
from Anthem as reported by Amerigroup, the operating company of Anthem (Balbi,
2015). Similar reports were reported by Verizon in the 2011 data breach experience
where phishing emails were opened and malware infected the executives’ laptops
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allowing access to the system (Baker, Goudie, Hutton, Hylender, Niemantsverdriet,
Novak, & Ostertag et al., 2011).
Access to health records is more desirable than gaining access to general credit
accounts because the files from health records contain more information such as Social
Security numbers, birth dates, addresses of the individual and significant others,
employment information, emergency contact information, and other personal
information. A collection of such personal information allows for rapid high-level
identity theft. Finkle (2013) discussed that Dell Secure Works identified in a recent
report that hackers can sell complete health insurance credentials for $20 per set of data
as opposed to $1 to $2 for each credit card number with a security code in underground
markets. Because there is a rapid high return when monetized with great profit for health
information over credit card data sets up to $20 or more as opposed to $1 to $2 when sold
in the underground, a very strong interest in sales of this information creates. The
healthcare organizations are more inviting targets for hackers and social engineers
because of the ease of breach and significant profitability. Finkle also discussed the
statements by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) warning that healthcare remains
vulnerable to cyber-attacks.
Healthcare costs in the United States were at 17.4 percent of the gross domestic
product in 2013 according to the Medicare and Medicaid Services (2014). These
healthcare costs include the burden of technology costs, security, and breach recovery.
The economic impact to the average organization costs $2,134,800 per organization
based on a calculation of an average of five attacks annually (“Criminal Attacks”, 2015).
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Most organizations report they are not confident they will be able to detect data losses in
the event of a breach. Response to security incidents is an obligation of the security
management team within the organization. Effective incident management is critical to
the reduction of threat impact to an organization. Ahmad, Hadgkiss, and Ruighaver
(2012) identify that the response process consists of five main practices, namely
“preparation for, identification, containment, the eradication and recovery from
incidents” (p. 643). Improvements in process related to the IT security in the healthcare
arena would allow for a potential impact of cost reduction, patient safety, and patient
satisfaction. Provided the employees were engaged within each of the four constructs
that lead to use behavior the resulting change in security protection would ultimately
position healthcare for cost reductions as a result of the decreased breach and risk.
Agaku et al. concluded that increased strategies are calling for higher security for the
protected health information so that the trust of the information security will not be
undermined any further. Recent public reports of security breaches within the healthcare
insurance companies’ serve to continue the media surge that will raise general citizen
concern that hospitals are more at risk causing lack of confidence. The general public is
concerned with privacy and their general security of the information. The Federal
Governments Office for Civil Rights at the Department of Human Services reports that
over the last five years there were 740 major security breaches within healthcare that
affected 29 million people (Abelson & Goldstein, 2015). Increasing the security within
the healthcare organizations creates a more confident feeling for patients individually and
extends to the global public who become more comfortable. Rapid and constant changes
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within healthcare require a continual reassessment of security status (Chopra, 2013). The
work of identifying one population’s perception with gained insight and potential for
improvement of the IT security behavior and handling of security practices may become
the catalyst to some of the change that is needed in healthcare security processes related
to IT management that will promote increased patient confidence.
Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, there has been an incorporation and presentation of review of the
literature staging a foundational frame for this work. An overview of the search and
review of literature collection procedures were presented. The conceptual framework
was developed from the work of Rogers (2003 & 2004) through to the model of UTAUT
(Venkatesh, 2003). The four core constructs that influence behavioral intention to use
technology within UTAUT have been highlighted for use and were discussed within the
literature; they include (a) performance expectancy, (b) effort expectancy, (c) social
influence, and (d) facilitating conditions. A review of the supporting literature was
conducted for each of the following categories, information security in healthcare, IT
security, nurse awareness, policy and penalty, password management, workflow, and risk
and breach.
Connections to social change include increased knowledge and understanding of
impacts to social change following the literature review. With dramatic costs to
healthcare organizations and 2.3 million adult victims of medical identity theft annually
there is a place for change. Moving into Chapter 3, I will discuss the research design,
development of the tool, data collection methods, and methods for data analysis. Chapter
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4 will include the discussion of techniques used for analysis of the data and emerged
findings in relationship to the research questions. Chapter 5 will incorporate discussion
of the areas for future research, implications to social change, and closing remarks.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore the perceptions of the
RN within four of the constructs of the unified theory of acceptance and usage of
technology (UTAUT) that are specific to use behavior (Venkatesh et al., 2003). The
experiences and perceptions of the registered nurse (RN) were analyzed as they related to
the UTAUT constructs of performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence,
and facilitating conditions. I formulated a research plan to conduct independent analysis
as themes emerged within each construct. The research methodology is set forth in
Chapter 3.
This chapter includes discussion of the research design that was used to conduct
this study. The role of the researcher, methodology, and the issues with trustworthiness
are each included in the research design. Within the methodology section a detailed
review of participant selection, instrumentation, expert panel review, procedures for
recruitment of the participants and their participation, data collection methods, and the
data analysis plan are each discussed in detail. Targeting the issue of trustworthiness for
exploration to confirm the credibility, transferability, dependability, confirmability, and
ethical procedures intended for use within the study procedures are reviewed.
Research Design and Rationale
In Chapter 2, the literature review provided a grounded base supporting the
importance of maintaining information technology (IT) security and the behaviors
associated with it that are essential to healthcare organizations. The purpose of this
qualitative case study was to explore how RNs perceive IT security behaviors in acute
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care hospital settings based on the UTAUT constructs of performance expectancy, effort
expectancy, social influence, and facilitating conditions. I asked the following
overarching research question for this study: What are RNs’ perceptions, expressed
intentions, and self-reported behaviors of IT security?
The following research questions were used to provide the supportive data
designed to guide the work of this research using the four constructs of UTAUT that are
consistent with behavioral intention and use behavior:
RQ 1: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors
of the performance expectancy of IT security practice?
RQ 2: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors
of the effort expectancy related to the IT security practice?
RQ 3: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors
of the social influence related to the IT security practice?
RQ 4: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors
of the facilitating conditions of the IT security practice?
A qualitative case study design was used to determine the perceived experiences
of the RNs recruited for this study. Merriam (2014) discussed that the value of a
qualitative study allows for the meaning of the problem being studied to be viewed within
the research as the user sees, experiences, or understands his or her world. The
qualitative study allows for interviewing the employees of the organization thus
providing insight into the RNs’ perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported
behaviors of the IT security and while using the constructs of UTAUT to guide the
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research. The qualitative case study with interviewing is a design more suited to this set
of research questions as I was seeking information related to the perceptions, expressed
intentions, and self-reported behaviors of the RN. Each of these attributes was discussed
in various themes that could be missed if other design methodologies would have been
used.
Other research designs available in the qualitative domain do not provide the
same depth for rich exploration within the case review. A phenomenological design
would allow the gathering of information but would limit the view of the clinical aspect
of interaction (Marshall & Rossman, 2016) one that is not optimal for the RN perception
of the world. The ethnographic design would have looked at the cultural behaviors
according to Marshall and Rossman (2016) and that would not have fulfilled the research
questions. The grounded theory would be used to find a new discovery or underlying
theory as described by Merriam (2014) and was not a correct fit for this work.
Role of the Researcher
As the researcher, interviewer, and observer, it was important to examine and be
aware of personal experience and potential conceptual ideas already framed related to the
planned research. Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff (2012) discussed that it may be
necessity to consider the development of controls measures by multiple contributors to
avoid risk for bias based on individual tendency for word choice or item formation.
Including other field experts in development along with a thorough examination of selfperceptions is essential to a well-developed study.
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The interest in IT security by RNs has intrigued me for as long as the electronic
systems have been in place in the hospital setting. I have been a manager who has dealt
with the consequences of poor conduct in IT security practice and related outcomes that
are impactful to the organization, patient, and employee. In the past, I had believed
managing staff who were noncompliant to comply with IT security in a hospital setting
was unavoidable because the scope was so large and perhaps unmanageable. As time has
passed and technology, security systems, base knowledge, and employee training has
improved there are known ways and best practices that lead to strongly secure
environments in many industries. Healthcare is not in line with other industries in the
level of security connections with employees and, as this became evident through the
literature, I became intent on exploring the RNs’ perceptions, expressed intentions, and
self-reported behaviors of IT security while practicing in the acute care hospital setting.
My role as the researcher took place with RNs who were part of the Three Rivers
Chapter AACN professional nursing organization and practiced in the clinical setting.
My continuous interest in the research was maintained in two realms, doctoral research
and nurse executive knowledge. The recruitment of participants was targeted and criteria
based with specific qualifications for inclusion. The criteria that was used for inclusion
served to eliminated the possibility of including any direct subordinates or RN employees
who I have influence over employment.
Methodology
This research study was conducted as a qualitative case study in the Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania region. Volunteers were recruited from a professional nursing organization
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using criteria based selection for participation. Interviewing methods for data collection,
usage of NVivo v11 for data maintenance and analysis, and conducting relational
application to UTAUT to operational findings were the procedural strategies used in this
study and are described in this section.
Setting
The professional nursing organization Three Rivers Chapter of American
Association of Critical Care Nurses (AACN) agreed to provide access to their
membership. I recruited potential candidates for interview from this professional
organization. The Three Rivers AACN had provided a letter of support (Appendix B)
following IRB approval. The Three Rivers Chapter AACN has many nursing members
who participate in the Beacon Award and nurses are eager to participate in research. I
was hopeful that the keen interest to participate in research by the RNs related to Beacon
would create an overzealous response to participate in this study. The potential for strong
interest in research was one additional reason for the need of selection criteria.
Participant Selection Logic
The population that was used for this study came from the membership of Three
Rivers Chapter AACN. The total membership includes 224 RNs from the Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania and the surrounding region. Request for volunteer participation was made
through email to membership contacts with an invitation to participate. The invitation to
participate outlined the specific criteria required for participation. Identification of
participants’ verification of meeting criteria was made at the point of initial contact with
me based on a self-report of an RN role. Participants who were selected self-reported to
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be RNs who met the following inclusion criteria: They (a) were a member of the Three
Rivers Chapter AACN, (b) worked full time in a clinical environment, (c) had been
oriented to the work environment, (d) had authentication (sign on) had privileges to the
electronic record in their work environment, (e) had access to the work policies and (f)
were willing to participate in the study.
The participants interested in the study were contacted for recruitment to this
study by e-mail as the initial contact. Access to the membership with contact information
attainable through Three Rivers AACN membership contact list and provided to me by
the individuals occurred once consented by the organizational administrative
representative of the professional organization (Appendix B). The initial contact to the
potential participant included a cover letter that served as an invitation to participate
including a description of the study intent and objectives with sample questions that
would be included in the interview. There was additional information for participation
available if the individual wanted it. The invitation to participate used to recruit
participants for interview was submitted to the IRB. The initial membership access and
fliers were provided as the initial contact to individuals. All follow-up communications
were conducted once the relationship was formally established between me and the
member.
Participants were interviewed to a sample size of 20 with saturation reached.
Saturation is defined as the time in the data collection process of the interviewing in
which there are no new concepts being brought forth or considered absent from what has
been being collected of those being interviewed (Fusch & Ness, 2015). Face-to-face
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interview methodology was used. The interview is appropriate to understand the lived
experience of the individuals by listening to their stories. Face-to-face interviews were
conducted for the purpose of obtaining data related to the particular phenomenon of this
topic. Seidman (2013) discussed that the interview allows an exploration of a potential
emergence of new content and findings. I expected to discover new findings. The
interview questions were posed in an unbiased manner using interview techniques that
are specifically crafted to maintain uniformity and objectivity. I maintained a neutral
manner during the interview process allowing for active listening throughout each
interview session. Each interviewee was allowed the opportunity to answer all items and
to provide any additional insight into the content matter of IT security behaviors.
Informed Consent
Informed consent was described within the cover letter requesting participation.
Once the potential participant expressed interest, I met face-to-face with the potential
candidate, explained the research and obtained informed consent. Informed consent as
described by Halse and Honey (2014) is the process of providing clear, well-defined, and
truthful information about the research. Informed consent is voluntary and must be
provided of free will by the participants. The informed consent must also address any
potential for distress or discomfort (Halse & Honey, 2014). I did discuss with
participants that I would keep copies of the participants informed consent documentation.
I then answered any questions that participants had by providing contact information.
The participant received a copy of the informed consent document. The prospective
participant was provided my contact information and was encouraged to make contact
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with any questions prior to or following our scheduled interview. Participants were
provided the opportunity to opt out or withdraw from the study up to the point of post
transcription verification (member checking) and prior to data entry into NVivo.
Instrumentation
A scripted questionnaire was used for direction during the interview. The
questionnaire allowed me to remain on topic and unbiased without missing essential
content, yet the open-ended questions allow the interviewee to answer with openness
related to his or her lived experiences. During each of the interviews, a basic audio
recorder was used so that the interview could be transcribed following the interaction.
Confidentiality of the interaction was discussed with the participant to allay any concerns
prior to the use of the recorder.
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
Recruitment for the study was voluntary and criteria based with self-reported
verification. The RNs who volunteered to participate in the study and met the criteria of
being a member of the Three Rivers Chapter AACN, working full time in the clinical
environment, having been oriented to their work environment, having authentication
(sign on) privileges to the electronic record in their work environment, and having access
to their work policies were invited to participate. Following a participant’s agreement to
enroll, I met with that individual to obtain informed consent and schedule the interview.
Once informed consent was obtained, scheduling for the meeting time and place for the
face-to-face interview with me occurred. My contact information was provided so that
the participant was able to contact me to answer any questions they may have had related

78
to logistics or the study. Once enrolled to participate, each participant was assigned a
unique code (ex. RN1, RN2, RN3, etc.) for identification. Private space that was
convenient for the member was provided for the interviewing session.
As the primary researcher, I conducted the interviews and collected the data.
Initially, there was a brief inquiry and collection of demographic data to align with the
literature that has been established including variances between male and female, age,
and educational preparation that have been shown to have a relationship to adoption of
technology and change. These demographic items may also play a role in the alignment
to the construct themes of UTAUT toward use behavior.
Each interview was expected to last approximately 30 to 45 minutes. Each
session was done in person with handwritten notes taken during the interview and an
audio recording made of the session. Following the interview session, the audio
recording was submitted to a secure transcription company to be fully transcribed to a
word document. Following transcription, member checking was conducted. The
member checking is a process of participant review of their transcribed interview to
assure accuracy of information. The member checking allows the interviewee to verify
that the information transcription is as accurate as possible (Harper & Cole, 2012).
Following member checking the data was input to NVivo v11 software for
analysis. The data collection of all interviews was conducted over a period of 3 months
to reach saturation. During that period, I made a second outreach to the membership with
requests for participation targeting additional participants within the professional
organization.
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At the conclusion of the interview, participants were thanked for their
participation and offered a contact number if they had any questions that arose following
their departure. All information gathered in the face-to-face interview were to be
transcribed verbatim into documents and stored into a secure computer program.
Participants have been made aware of study results and presentations of the study through
the Three Rivers Chapter AACN.
Confidentiality was assured to the participants upon agreement to engage in the
study as part of the consent process. The participant was provided with my contact
information upon enrollment. My contact information was provided for the key purpose
of contact in the event of a question but also in the event of the participant desiring to exit
the study. A participant was afforded the possibility to exit the study at any time for any
reason. The exit would be completed by contacting me to opt out.
Data Analysis Plan
Data analysis was conducted using NVivo v11 qualitative data analysis software.
The data was input to the program from the interview observations, researcher notes, and
transcriptions following the audio recordings and member checking of the interviews.
Headings were used for theme development to capture key areas of concepts that
emerged. Several rounds of coding were required to identify the categories of themes
(Bazeley & Jackson, 2013). The themes represent the interviewees lived experiences
related to perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors of IT security.
Bernauer, Lichtman, Jacobs, and Robinson (2013) discussed that NVivo provides a
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model for researchers that allows them to use critical thinking processes in applications
and presentation of data and conceptual relationships.
The type of coding that I performed was labeling and chunking of information
categories as themes emerge. With the use of NVivo the natural language processing was
used on text transcriptions to assist in the determination of themes along with the
researcher determination and coding. Crowston, Allen, and Heckman (2012) discussed
the advantageous and cost effective nature of natural language processing when used in
qualitative research processes. Their work highlighted aspects of coding to include
conceptual coding of emotional expressions, positive politeness, and negative politeness
and the importance of capturing this information within the bracketing of information.
According to Tufford and Newman (2012) and Sorsa, Kiikkala, and Astet-Kurki (2015)
bracketing is used when personal experiences may trigger preconceptions about the
information being collected. By using bracketing throughout the collection of
information and coding process awareness is maintained. This information is being
stored in NVivo.
The researcher is responsible for acquiring the appropriate level of interpretive
data from the interview that is fundamental in qualitative research (Merriam, 2014).
When discrepant data is identified and is associated to a case interview that case would
be excluded from the analysis and the inclusion for saturation. The study credibility was
strengthened by assuring that these measures are were place.
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Issues of Trustworthiness
Credibility
The qualitative case study method allows for construct validity through evidence
established from a chain of multiple sources, member checking, pattern matching,
explanation building and using logic models (Amerson, 2011). Internal validity was
supported with saturation. According to Fusch and Ness (2015), saturation is reached
when there is no new information, no new coding, no new themes, and an ability to
replicate the study and this must be in place to enhance the validity of the qualitative
study.
The interview questionnaire was submitted to an expert panel of four individuals
who were experienced and respected as knowledgeable and proficient in informatics
science and technology. Each of the panel members were invited by email (Appendix C)
to review the 31 questions that had been developed for relevance to the study,
appropriateness to the topic, accuracy in content, and clarity to the population. Two
clarity issues were identified during the initial review. Those issues were corrected.
Following the corrections, a resubmission of the interview questions (Appendix D) was
circulated to the expert panel for final review and approval. Expert approval was granted
by all members of the panel. Validating the questionnaire through the use of an expert
panel lends credibility to the process of qualitative research (Bengtsson, 2016).
Transferability
The external validity of this qualitative case study was supported by using the
constructs of UTAUT as the foundation for the research questions. The use of UTAUT
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allows for an established protocol incorporated into the study design (Amerson, 2011).
The framework of UTAUT and each of the constructs being used within this research
study were established and validated thus support the work as proposed in this research
study. Thomas and Magilvy (2011) discussed the transferability of a study as applying
research findings from one group or population to another. The findings from this study
were expected to have applicability to other clinical populations within the healthcare
arena.
Dependability
Dependability was assured through comparative hand notes taken by the me and
the audio recording that was transcribed verbatim by a secure transcription company with
repeated review following transcription. I conducted those repeated reviews of the audio
recordings. The purpose of the repeated reviews was to improve interpretation and
identify cues related to the lived experience that had been shared during the interview. I
input all elements of data collected, researcher notes, audio recordings, transcripts, etc.
into NVivo v11 software that provided assistance to me in determining accurate and
dependable results.
Confirmability
Confirmability, sometimes considered neutrality of the qualitative study, was
achieved when each of the following had been addressed according to Noble and Smith
(2015); (a) truth value, (b) consistency, and (c) applicability. Links, philosophical
positions, or experiences associated to me functioning in the position as the researcher
and were not revealed throughout. Tufford and Newman (2012), and Sorsa et al. (2015)
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identified that bracketing supports increased reflexivity by the researcher when conducted
thoughtfully.
Ethical Procedures
The nine procedures of this research were conducted within the framework of
approval under the Walden University Internal Review Board (IRB). Permission to
conduct this study was granted under IRB number 07-22-16-0232839 with an expiration
date of July 21, 2017. Within this approval informed consent was approved as described.
All participant recruitment and data collection commenced following the approval of the
research by the IRB.
Confidentiality was assured to the participants upon agreement to engage in the
study as part of the consent process. The professional nursing organization participation
provided for members from many areas within the region to participate. Various
locations of office settings that were both easy to access and not identified as specific to
any identified organization or hospital were made available for use as the interview
locations creating an anonymous setting. The site was neither the same location as the
professional organization nor their workplace. Data collection occured through the
interviews with audio recordings and journal notes resulting in transcripts and electronic
data entry. All data (transcripts, recordings, journal notes, and any other electronic data)
are stored in a secure location in which all data is securely housed (external
drive/password protected). This measure allows for increased security, anonymity, and
confidentiality for the participants. Data handling and maintenance procedures were
discussed with participants in full disclosure and transparency. The transcribed
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information from the interviews were stored in a secure computer environment. The
participant codes, consents, meeting schedules, and any other data collected were housed
in a locked area that only I have access. This data will be maintained for a period of 5
years. The destruction of contact information occurred following the completion of study
and before the formal sharing of those results at professional forums.
Summary
This chapter included a presentation of the research methodology and design for
this qualitative case study. The purpose of the study and research questions were
presented continuing to guide the study. My role as the researcher was reviewed along
with the relationship to the research participants. Access to the population, protection of
that population, and treatment of information including management of all data
maintenance was detailed. Interview procedures were reviewed as the method of data
collection, followed by data analysis and assurance of rigor. In Chapter 4, I discussed the
data analysis procedures and presented study findings that included the labeling and
themes that emerged from the case studies as they relate to the research questions.
Finally, Chapter 5 addressed the interpretations, implications, and potential applications
of the findings along with limitations and conclusions of the work, as well as identified
future research. Implications for social change are incorporated into the final discussion.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore the perceptions of the
registered nurse (RN) within four of the constructs of the unified theory of acceptance
and usage of technology (UTAUT) that are specific to use behavior (Venkatesh et al.,
2003). Gaining insight into the lived experiences of RNs related to information
technology (IT) security was at the heart of this study. The experiences and perceptions
of the RN were analyzed as they relate to the UTAUT constructs of performance
expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence, and facilitating conditions. Using the
UTAUT model as the theoretical framework, the following overarching research question
was used for this study: What are RNs’ perceptions, expressed intentions, and selfreported behaviors of IT security?
Using the four constructs of UTAUT that are consistent with behavioral intention
and use behavior, the four following research questions were used as supportive to the
overarching research question:
RQ 1: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors
of the performance expectancy of IT security practice?
RQ 2: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors
of the effort expectancy related to the IT security practice?
RQ 3: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors
of the social influence related to the IT security practice?
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RQ 4: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors
of the facilitating conditions of the IT security practice?
In this chapter, I present the data analysis with results. The data collection and
analysis were derived from 20 RNs who met the requirements of participation, including
that the individual was an RN and also a member of the professional organization Three
Rivers Chapter of the American Association of Critical Care Nurses (AACN), worked
full time in a clinical environment, had been oriented to the work environment, had
authentication (sign on) privileges to the electronic record in the work environment, and
had access to the work policies. Each of the participants shared through an interview
their experiences and information of those lived experiences related to IT security in the
clinical area of which they were employed. The results include insight from direct quotes
of the participant interviews. Exploration of the participants’ relationship with and
knowledge of IT security as their lived experience has yielded multiple findings related to
the RNs’ use of IT security in relation to the research questions with underlying similarity
to research premises in quantitative studies presented in the literature review.
Research Setting
The face-to-face interviews were held in meeting spaces that were available to me
and conveniently located for the participant. All sessions were held in locations that
provided privacy for the participants’ protection and quiet for recording purposes. One
participant requested to meet at her organization prior to her work shift, otherwise all
meetings were held away from the workplace organizations at public office or meeting
locations.
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Influences that may have impacted interviews include two participants scheduling
interviews following their 12-hour shifts and two scheduling interviews immediately
prior to their shifts of work. In the first situation when the interviews were held
following a shift, the participants could have been tired or anxious to finish quickly. It
was possible they might have just wanted to get home, although in both cases, the
interviews were similar in length to all the others. In the second scenario where they
were scheduled prior to their shift, they might have been nervous about getting to work
on time. In both of these cases, they were relaxed during the interview and conversed
openly without giving the impression that they were hurried.
Participant Demographics and Sampling Strategy
Following AACN approval through the Letter of Agreement (Appendix B) and
IRB approval, emails were submitted to AACN members through the connections
feature, fliers were circulated, and announcements were made at the local monthly
meetings to garner participation from the purposeful population of the local AACN
chapter, Three Rivers Chapter AACN membership. The initial call for participants
resulted in 14 responses over 2 months. A follow up request was made that afforded an
additional six responses. Several members were interested in participating but did not
meet the criteria for inclusion because they were fully immersed in an educational or
management position and not currently practicing in a clinical area. The criteria for
participation included that the individual was an RN and also a member of the
professional organization Three Rivers Chapter AACN, worked full time in a clinical
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environment, had been oriented to the work environment, had authentication privileges to
the electronic record in the work environment, and had access to the work policies.
Those who participated in the study came from the Three Rivers Chapter AACN
that has over 224 members, with about 30 members actively participating in monthly
meetings. The members come from various hospitals and hospital systems from the
tristate area of Western Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia. The RNs who
participated in the study came with a wide range of experiences although not included in
the demographic data. Some were lifelong critical care RNs, others had experiences in
many different clinical settings. Some had been staff nurses throughout their career, and
others had various specialty or management experiences in their past. I did not collect
these types of details within the demographic details. The demographic data were
purposefully kept to a minimum to maintain anonymity. Following the introductory
discussion, the demographics were discussed. Each participant was given an option to
opt out or to share the demographic information that included (a) their sexual
identification as male or female, (b) the age range group that they fit into, (c) the highest
RN education that they had received, (d) the highest non-RN education they had
received, and (e) the years they had been employed as an RN (Table 1).
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Table 1
Participant Demographics
Participant

Sex

Age group
26-35

Highest RN
education
BSN

Highest nonRN ed.
—

Years RN
employment
5

RN 1

F

RN 2

F

56-65

MSN

—

39

RN 3

F

66+

MSN

—

50

RN 4

F

56-65

MSN

—

28

RN 5

F

26-35

Diploma

BS

2

RN 6

F

56-65

MSN

—

35

RN 7

F

26-35

BSN

—

7

RN 8

F

46-55

BSN

—

27

RN 9

F

46-55

BSN

BS

30

RN 10

F

46-55

BSN

LNCC

8

RN 11

F

26-35

BSN

—

5

RN 12

F

46-55

BSN

—

28

RN 13

M

26-35

AD

BS

2

RN 14

F

56-65

BSN

—

37

RN 15

M

36-45

AD

MBA/HMS

10

RN 16

F

56-65

Diploma

—

37

RN 17

F

46-55

BSN

—

31

RN 18

F

26-35

BSN

—

4

RN 19

F

46-55

Diploma

—

28

RN 20

F

26-35

BSN

—

5
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Data Collection
Data collection was conducted as approved by the IRB to fulfill the study
requirements. A targeted approach was conducted for recruitment of participants from
the Three Rivers Chapter AACN professional nursing organization using email contacts,
fliers, and chapter newsletter articles. Recruitment for the study was voluntary and
criteria based with self-reported verification. The 20 RNs who volunteered to participate
in the study met the criteria of being a member of the Three Rivers Chapter AACN,
working full time in the clinical environment, having been oriented to their work
environment, having authentication privileges to the electronic record in their work
environment, and having access to their work policies. Following a participant’s
agreement to enroll, I met with that individual to schedule a meeting time and place.
During the scheduled face-to-face meeting following a brief introduction, I conducted an
explanation of the research, reviewed the informed consent with provision for questions
and clarification, and obtained signed consent for participation. Once informed consent
was obtained, the face-to-face interview began.
My contact information was provided so that the participant would be able to
contact me to answer any questions they may have related to logistics or the study. As
each participant was enrolled he or she was assigned a unique code (ex. RN1, RN2, RN3,
etc.) for identification. This code was cross referenced on a master list that only I
maintained. The voice recording and any other records of the interview, including my
interview notes were recorded using the candidate’s unique code only. The candidates
were instructed on the privacy coding and security of data management. They were
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given the information about the transcriber being the only other individual receiving the
recorded file that would be identified only by the assigned unique code.
Prior to recording the interview, I collected demographic information from the
candidate. Following the initial conversation and demographic questioning, I waited
until the candidate was generally exhibiting a sense of being comfortable. I then
conducted the interview, both recording the session and taking researcher notes as data
collection methods. The 20 interviews lasted between 26 and 38 minutes. Following
each of the interview sessions, the audio recording was transcribed verbatim to a word
document by a secure transcription company. Upon return of the transcribed document, I
reviewed it for any major errors and then forwarded it to the candidate so that member
checking could be conducted. The member checking process for most participants did
not require any changes. However, two participants, RN 17 and RN 19 had several
requests for changes to their documents that were made through multiple rounds of
review. Harper and Cole (2012) discussed that member checking is the method of
assuring accuracy of the transcription when allowing the interviewee to review the
document. Following completion of member checking, the data were input to NVivo v11
software for analysis.
The data collection from interviews was conducted over a period of 3 months to
reach saturation and volume. Neither the minimum number of participants, nor saturation
was reached with the initial call for participation so a second round of targeted
recruitment occurred. Following the second recruitment effort there were enough
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interviews accomplished to reach both minimum number of participants for the study and
saturation.
Once the recording of an interview was concluded, the participant was thanked
for his or her participation and offered a contact number in the event that he or she might
have questions or would decide that they wanted to withdraw from the study for any
reason following the departure. Each participant was reassured of his or her privacy,
understanding the data would be maintained for 5 years with the electronic files being
encrypted and along with other files be locked in a secure location. Each participant
folder that is identified with a unique identifier maintains my individual notes. Those
folders are locked securely along with all other paper materials and the encrypted drive of
files (voice recordings, excel. NVivo) from this study.
Data Analysis
I used inductive and deductive coding for data analysis. I first used coding that
aligned with the UTAUT theoretical framework that the research questions were based
upon and the general area category titles of the topics of questions included in the
interview. Then I went back and identified additional themes that were emerging from
the response text naming codes into categories of similar content. I linked the codes
following the two sessions of coding to identify like nodes and classifications of codes
allowing for a comprehensive and thorough coding of the data. This coding effort
identified predetermined nodes and emerging nodes resulting in a total of 62 nodes.
Detailed assessment and further coding allowed for the combination and coordination of
primary themes and subthemes (both parent and child nodes) and was finalized into 42
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nodes with eight parent nodes or primary themes within NVivo v11. Six of the eight
parent nodes have UTAUT constructs that correspond with the nature of the parent and
child nodes (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Parent nodes and associated UTAUT constructs. Parent nodes identified and
compiled with UTAUT constructs during data analysis to identify findings for the answer
to the overarching research question.
Each of the primary themes and subthemes is presented with a representation of
participant quotes to represent the findings within that theme or subtheme development.
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Primary Theme 1: Walk Away No Log-Off
Computer log-off was discussed in the literature review as an important aspect of
IT security presented as a potential for lack of understanding or connection with IT
security. Albarrak (2012) discussed that 16% of the nurses allowing for others to access
confidential information under their authentication was because they did not log-off of
the system. The lived experience of this sample is that walking away from the computer
without log-off is a reality as part of the regular workflow. Samples of participant
responses are presented in Table 2.
Table 2
Primary Theme 1: Walk Away No Log-Off
Participant Response
RN 1

“I think that nurses are always pulled in a couple of different directions at
one time. So, you’re doing multiple things. Whether you have a computer
actually in the room and you walk away from it or it’s a computer at the
desk and you end up walking away from it due to family, call bells,
doctors, grounds, I mean times of different scenarios. But I have been
guilty.”

RN 11

“Pretty much all the time. Constantly if I have to run to a med room
because I was getting medication and I forget to grab a medication. To go
in and say for example maybe I work in the ICU. So, if a patient is
starting to wake up then attempts to self-exacerbate or something crazy
like that, like fly right in the room. So, pretty frequently.”

RN 15

“Oh! They are several, I work in the ICU. So, I'm constantly called away
to answer a monitor or a colleague and there some pretty important things
we have in the IUC to answer this quickly. So, I’d say during shift I'm
probably called away without logging off my computer at least 6 times.”

RN 9

“Only usually during an emergency. Like if something they might have a
patient jumps out of bed and you got to catch them or something on the
monitor. But other than that, I usually log off.”
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Participants described the desire to log-off believing it was the correct process but that it
was not part of their regular workflow. Three respondents stated that they do log-off but
they went on to describe situations that occur causing situations with an inability to logoff.
Within this first primary theme there were six subthemes to emerge. They include
staff awareness of safeguards in place to protect them if they walked away from their
computer and left it unattended, did those safeguards inhibit patient care, were they aware
if anyone had ever used their account, what was the unit norm for log-off, what did they
think others reasons were for not logging off, and did it make a difference if the computer
could be seen. Examples of participant responses are shared in Tables 3 - 8.
Table 3
Safeguard for Walk Away
Participant Response
RN 2

“I do know that the computer does log off, after a period of time, but I
don’t recall what that period of time is. Because I know that, if I don’t
utilize the electronic medical record for you know some period of time it
just automatically logs you off. So, I don’t know the exact time but there
is some type of safeguard.”

RN 5

“I know our system does log you off after a certain amount of time, and it
will lock it for you. But I’m not sure of the amount of time that is.”

RN 6

“Yes, after a time period the computer goes into a, like shut down mode
or it logs me off automatically.”

RN 7

“I know like it goes to a screensaver that locks out, but I don’t know how
long, like what the actual time is.”
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Sethi, Lane, Newton, Egan, & Ghosh (2014) discussed that the clinical desktop at
the nursing station is a source of potential breach and is best to have an auto log-off. The
RNs were aware that there was a safeguard but they did not know the timing nor how it
actually worked. A few included that the feature was more of a hindrance to their care
than a help. They discussed that because it had such a rapid lock out feature that they
were then required to login again quite regularly throughout the shift causing wasted
time. This created the next theme of Walk away safeguard inhibiting care.
Table 4
Walk Away Safeguard Inhibits Care
Participant Response
RN 1

“I’m at the patient’s bedside and then all of a sudden it’s already logged
off. So, I guess those are good things. Sometimes they delay care
because you’re constantly logging back in when you’re at the bedside.”

RN 10

“I think maybe if the screen would not time out, I could give better care.
It is a distractor.”

RN 16

“Sometimes they delay care because you’re constantly logging back in
while at the bedside.”

Gaining insight into the RNs understanding of what happens during that period of
time while the computer is unattended and logged in under their authentication
credentials was provided during discussion with these elements. They each discussed
what happens while they are not logged off and away from the computer, had anyone
used their computer. Many of the nurses responded in a way that signified an emotional
strong interest to discuss this topic. They were open to discuss situations demonstrating
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that accounts could easily be used between people and electronic signatures would be
intertwined. They discussed the risks of this documentation, authentication of wrong
types of accounts such as physician for nurse and vice versa, and the general risk of
access to information that is not appropriate. They expressed passion and interest for
detail as they engaged in their recounts of situations related to account use and misuse.
Two respondents were very concerned about the “trouble” (discipline) they would face
because they were looking at records they should not be viewing.
Table 5
Someone Used My Account
Participant Response
RN 13

“Yes, like if you logged on and you might walk away for a second
somebody just wants to print out a clinical note or other clinical doc.”

RN 5

“Yes, some just jump on the logged-on computers if you might walk away
for a second when they just want to view labs or clinical info.”

RN 8

“Yes, because I’ve come back to the desk and found doctors using mine,
like where I haven’t signed out and my name is still on the computer. I
make them log off, log back in under their own name.”

RN 8

“Yes, and they were looking at patient records which that’s not my patient
that I’m caring for and I can get in trouble.”

Each participant was willing to discuss the unit norm and while they generally
began their discussion with the unit norm is to log-off, they would quickly follow up with
reasons why their peers did not log-off on a regular basis. With probing into this matter
of log-off, they would describe that there was widespread variation in log-off procedures
within their unit setting.
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Table 6
Unit Norm: No Log-Off
Participant Response
RN 2

“In some cases, if someone is taking care of their patient they may have
their WOW at the door and then they go and take care of the patients but
without logging off. Sometimes they, will have their screen still be out,
but they will go and get medicines, they will go and get any patient care
supplies.
So, it’s not consistent, that people log off as soon as they walk away from
the screen. It’s like up, with the patient’s information there it may not be
facing a common area, sometimes it is, sometimes it’s not. So, I can
definitely see kind of a mix of both, where screen has been facing public
areas, and the screens where, times when the screen is not facing public
areas.
I guess kind of a little bit of both distraction, thinking about their next task
that they have to do rather than you know logging out and securing the
computer before they leave.”

RN 7

“I would say more often than not people are not logging off, it just
depends I guess how busy we are. Or you’re probably in the middle of
doing stuff, walk away, you know, kind of forget to log off. You’re just
going to be like, oh crap, I didn’t log off and then.”

RN 8

“I would think it’s a norm to walk away without logging off.”

RN 18

“I’d say the norm is not logging off. We have had computers in every
room as well as outside of the rooms and also at the nursing station. It’s
not uncommon to have a nurse leave their screen up in a room or
especially in a nurse’s station.”

While discussing peers not logging off, additional discussion and insight into
those reasons for no log-off emerged and formulated the subtheme for why others in the
unit did not log-off. While the RNs were only attempting to surmise these reasons
because they know the workflow and work closely within the unit, it was reasonable to
attempt a discussion about their impressions and observations.
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Table 7
Unit Others: No Log-Off Reason
Participant Response
RN 12

“I think it’s a matter of convenience they just walk away or they think
they are going to come back and pick up where they left off. Like if they
are interrupted to go see a patient or whatever. But, many times they are
done with rounds and they are logged on until it actually logs them out
automatically.”

RN 14

“I see people leaving theirs, because that’s where they are charting at this
particular desk. But then it really, it shuts off, I mean you can’t keep it the
whole night. Researcher note: Participant looked visibly upset during this
discussion as if she was shaking with concern for the violation in
process.”

RN 17

“They could have looked at meds and went to get the meds and just
wanted to still be in that computer because they have to go to the med cart
and then come back and check their meds against the med list. They
didn’t want to log in again because it takes too long to boot up.”

RN 18

“I think it’s probably mostly convenience. Also, I think sometimes if
nurses are in the middle of charting a complete assessment. They may fear
that closing out that they’ll lose their spot even though that’s not true.
Most of the time when they do walk away from the computer it is for
patient care.”

The subtheme of computers being seen emerged as participants’ responses about
computer location on their units and the workflow that they use to document related to
log-off. RNs and physicians have a code of honesty so they feel protected in their
domain and if the computer is in a zone that only they can see they feel as though they
will protect it so there is less need to log-off. If it is not in a zone that is well protected or
encompassed by staff, they will more likely log-off.
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Table 8
Computers Can Be Seen
Participant Response
RN 6

“Where I work is pretty open and you can, everyone has visuals of what’s
happening. So, if someone walked over you would see it.” Researcher
Note: Implied in discussion that staff would go right to it and protect that
PC.

RN 9

“If somebody was at a computer where you were, and they didn’t belong
there, especially at the bedside that would be very obvious.”

RN 2

“If we see each other’s computers, we protect those so that no one
accesses them that should not. We have each other’s backs you could
say.”

While not all nurses specifically discussed the visualization of the computers they
each echoed the concept of trust working as a group within their respective units. This
extended into the discussion of passwords and the use of accounts or working with each
other in the clinical area.
Primary Theme 2: Password Challenges
The primary theme of password challenges had subthemes emerge in the areas of
ease of use/log-on, supports workflow, sharing password or account, password sharing
situation, reward for sharing, share by badge scanning, password frustration, and clinical
concern. Albarrak (2012) identified that the behaviors of nurses allow for the potential
security risk related to the password practices. The findings in the interviews of these 20
participants found that there are many password challenges they face and these tend to
factor into the subthemes related to passwords.
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Table 9
Primary Theme 2: Password Challenges
Participant Response
RN 3

“I’ve had to change it because I was told by security that, I guess they do
a check on social media and somehow my password was seen somewhere
and I had to change it.”

RN 6

“Before it was a simple password, now it’s a complicated password that
you have to come up invent some complicated password. Now, they don’t
want you to reuse a password that you’ve used in the past. So, that’s made
it more complicated.”

RN 14

“I mean you have to change it. Well so far, I think I’ve only had to change
it twice in epic but you finally get your grove with the numbers and the
letters and you know the password and then 3 months later you are
changing it again. So, it’s just hard, we have so many passwords all the
times and then you are off for a week and you are like, okay, my
password was just changed which one was it now, they are trying, we
should write it down more often.”

RN 15

“The problem too with the passwords is, like sometimes I would just
make a change on it, like maybe, like say my password is abcdefg capital
A, then you had to add a number oh! I would make the last number 1.
Then the next time I have to change I'll make capital A, bcdefg2. Well our
systems seem to be getting a little smarter. They are like, “Well you can't
have that because that’s similar to what your last one was.” So, then you
have to come up with something brand new and then that really makes it
hard to remember what that password is. Especially when it's one of the
accounts that you don’t use too often.”

Challenges of password is closely associated to password use which was quickly
identified as a subtheme with rich information related to the many additions of
technology to the workplace that require password access and have associated workflow
process.
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Table 10
Password Ease of Use
Participant Response
RN 5

“Very easy because now we have finger prints AcuDose but then to log
on to our computer we just use single sign on, so, I only have to type it in
once my whole shift and that’s it. Then any time after that you can just
use your badge to enroll, sign you on automatically.”

RN 8

“Your badge is encrypted and you touch, they have little, there are little
boxes on your computer that you just, you log in the first time in the
morning and it will keep you, I would say it’s probably 12½ hours, it’ll,
when you tap your badge to that box it will log you in. which I can see
will be a problem with someone that holds a badge.”

RN 11

“Pretty easy, I usually stick with one or two, and switch between the 2,
and I try to just keep it simple so, I would say it’s easy.”

RN 20

“Pretty easy, I’m pretty sufficient with being able to type quickly so, I can
memorize my password for the 12 weeks or whatever it is until I have to
reset the new one.”

Ease of use for password was considered to be fairly easy and adjunct technology
was considered better than the electronic medical record because it was typically
described as more advanced including fingerprint or single sign on (SSO) technology.
Along with this discussion there was raised another subtheme of ease of log-on.
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Table 11
Ease of Log-In
Participant Response
RN 10

“Pixis, Epic, and the email were all the same log-on. So, when you would
go to get your meds out it was the same, along with the finger press scan,
your initial sign and it was all the same password and then log in. So, it
made it easier.”

RN 13

“We have finger prints for AcuDose and log on to our computer with
badge to enroll. This will sign you on automatically so sign in is only
once my whole shift then I just tap and get on the computer.”

RN 18

“Single sign in badge works for all systems that you access.”

The responses related to ease of log-on for many participants was a discussion
specific to the use of single sign on (SSO) technology related to timesaving and
advantages for workflow. Password effect on RN workflow followed in the discussion.
Table 12
Password Supports Workflow
Participant Response
RN 1

“I think there is a necessity for passwords, I do like at, my casual job that
I can type your password in and you’re logged in to the system and then
you can actually scan your badge. So, that helps my workflow.”

RN 11

“I would say the password is part of my work. I think if an error occurs,
like say narcotic discrepancies or meds that were previously given. it’s
easier to track future discrepancies and the medication for example. I
think it easily identifies the user in case there is an error with anything.”

RN 19

“Yeah because no one can get into it and access your stuff.”

RN 20

“Yeah, it’s just how it is.”
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Once password challenges and password workflows were freely discussed the
sharing of passwords and accounts were discussed as a consequence of difficulty of
password access. While some participants reacted somewhat cautiously all responded
openly and willing to talk about unit culture and their “feeling” about what should or
should not happen and what actually happens during their normal days at work. There
were no responses of individual sharing of a password. Several participants shared
situations of knowing of sharing passwords and being aware of sharing but they
personally had never shared their password. Several participants had shared accounts
through badge sharing which is described as a separate subtheme, Share by Badge
Scanning (Table 16).
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Table 13
Sharing Password or Account
Participant Response
RN 2

“I have not shared, not me personally.”

RN 10

“I can’t imagine needing anyone else’s password if we have the same
access.”

RN 14

“I don’t feel like, since we moved to a new system, but before we have
somebody that’s very busy. You are in the middle of resuscitating a
patient and you had already logged on your charting and somebody will
say, “What’s your password?” Because they want to close your thing out
so they can jump on finish charting whatever were doing in the room.”
“I can honestly say, I've never given either to each and that’s only because
I have such a paranoid personality that even close coworker would. Well
here is something that happened years ago. Coworker as a practical joke
someone left their computer open and while the person was gone she went
in and typed kind of like something funny in the chart. That wouldn’t be
appropriate to be written on the chart and was certainly not related to the
patient at all. The person came back and maybe types the person and hits
save. So, that now became part of the preliminary record. I felt, “Oh! My
God! I can never have that happen to me.” I felt oh! You know I have
worked with a bunch of tricksters and stuff not that this would ever
happen and be like such one of the better chance of happen.
So, I just never have given that out. I've been in situations where other
people have said to me, “Oh! my password is just, just type it in really
quick.” You know they need something and I do. But I keep thinking well
I can't be the person to go back in and do it. Plus, I can't remember
password. So, a series of numbers after that I can't remember. So, I won't
say I haven’t but I have used other people’s passwords to get into their
accounts.”

RN 15

Several participants discussed situations that sharing passwords might occur or
that they had been aware of password sharing in the past. Those situations were captured
within a subtheme.
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Table 14
Password Sharing Situation
Participant Response
RN 4

RN 11

“They don’t have time to document so, they will do it for them or they
will, the nurse will do it and she would, the doctor might say, put some
orders in for me. So, they would know their password and then put them
in or the doctor would walk away and say, my computer is open you can
use it and put these orders in or look for this for me.”
“I know sometimes people, people that have previously worked where I
currently work will come back to pick up like over time. But then are not
in like press B system anymore. So, they get kind of logged out of certain
things, and I think in that instance they would like need to use somebody
else’s ID and password.”

RN 15

“It's usually like an emergency situation. Beginning with I work in ICU
so, patient is going on the tubes and they are hanging a bunch of bags like
pressers which keeps blood pressure up. They are just like, “Type this in
and try that we hang this or throw a set of vitals in for me real quick?”
because they are maybe doing God knows what.
I mean if there are expressions or something that should not be written
down manually but we might not have gotten to that point yet but we
might be suffering the dream we call it. We just want to start documenting
but they have so many other things they need to do.”

RN 19

“If someone is at home and you want to look up their lab work and they
are not there. Or you want to check something for them that is their
personal information in their chart.”

Interestingly, one of the examples of sharing passwords was for personal record
review while the employee was off campus and had another employee check their
personal health record. In this scenario, it was not related to access to the electronic
medical record for patient care, documentation, or workflow improvement. According to
the participant this information could have been gained through a patient portal by the
individual who had shared the password. When the aspects of password sharing
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situations were provided, I probed and asked what the reward for sharing a password
might be. The rewards became another subtheme.
Table 15
Reward for Sharing
Participant Response
RN 4

“The benefit is to know that he or she doesn’t have to do the work that the
nurse is doing the work for them.”

RN 5

“It’s just faster because to log on and to log off takes so long.”

RN 11

“They can’t get in to anything because they are not necessarily in press B
system anymore, but kind of outsource or work elsewhere. Now have
access to system through our password.”

RN 14

“That’s for the patient, I mean it’s because we are busy doing patient care.
I mean we are not just sitting at the desk next to them. We are not
standing next to them in the room, you know, I mean we are busy
physically doing something with the patient that I can’t really just turn
around and put my password in if I’m changing an IV dressing.”

There was no identification by participants that they personally shared their
password but they shared many examples of password sharing that they were aware of
previously in their experience and currently within their departments. Through the
discussion of advantages, a twist on sharing passwords was described. This subtheme is
about account sharing in that the RNs with a badge registered as single sign on (SSO)
will swipe in and allow another RN to use their account for access or pass off their badge
to allow access, primarily for documentation and review of data. Respondents described
hand off of badges to each other for various reasons, in one case to non-RN staff.
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Table 16
Share by Badge Scanning
Participant Response
RN 1

“I do like at, my casual job how you can type your password in and you’re
logged in to the system and then you can actually scan your badge. So,
that helps my workflow and our team working together sharing.”

RN 5

“So, we actually do use each other’s account by swiping the badge for
each other during rapid admissions and critical events when we work as a
team. But we never do share actual passwords.”

RN 13

“I’m getting an admission and they’re charting. I give them my badge so
they do single sign on under my name. They can search for anything
under me like vital signs, new labs, and stuff.”

RN 18

“Other than that, sometimes the badging situation can be of concern if
people lend their badges out to go get coffees. Or lend their badges out to
get to medication room. So, if they logged in once with their passwords
that the badge can find into any computer with just tapping it on by the
computer. Most times that the badges are handed off is when we have
like a coffee shops and a bunch of people want coffee. So, one person will
go to pay for it because we can pay with our badges too. Then there are
scenarios, not too often but if I'm in a patient’s room doing patient care
and one of the nursing assistants comes up to me and says they need in the
medication room which is only in the night shift. Because they stock in
there they have to get in but they don’t have access with their badges. So,
they have to get our badge to get in so that they can stock and that’s it.”

While discussing the need to share badges and other password practices there
were discussions of frustrations with passwords. Balozian and Leidner (2016) discussed
the developments of frustration creating an avoidance of technology and the use of
security practices. This is consistent with the findings of the participants in this study as
the more frustrating the work of IT security becomes the more they looked for
workarounds.
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Table 17
Password Frustration
Participant Response
RN 1

“It’s time consuming to retype that all the time, but my fulltime job, we
don’t have that capability of scanning the badge. So, I do have to
physically type my password every time I go on to a computer.”

RN 6

“It gets more complicated, I think as the years have gone by. Before it was
a simple password, now it’s a complicated password that you have to
come up invent some complicated password. Now, they don’t want you to
reuse a password that you’ve used in the past. So, more complicated.
And we have so many logins. I mean to get to the actual screen where I’m
doing my work, I’ve signed in, or I attempted to sign in 3 or 4 times. You
sign in and maybe you mistype or have a typo to sign in again.
Then another screen pops up and then you have to sign in again and then
you might mistype again. So, times it’s like 4 or 5 attempts to signing in
before you actually can get your work done.”

RN 12

“We have so many different passwords for different things, and they let
you help to log in and we can use them simultaneously if there are all
logging out after only a few seconds. That’s just going to take more time
away from the bed side care.”

RN 17

“Logging in and off just this morning I had to look at chart records and it
was 3 screens that I had to log into just to get there. I don’t know why but
I do that many times a day. Our organization is so built on administration
and then this world that takes care of patients that they don’t realize the
impact and like say, “Oh! Didn’t you get that email?” well the email does
not cross into the patient. But it's all these layers of security that sort of
make a barrier for you to get that information flow to this information
flow. So, now I didn’t know that the system is going down in 5 minutes.
Now I didn’t know that because I don’t look at my emails while I'm
taking care of patients. I think security is probably why we don’t easily
connect. I don’t know why it's not my thing to know. But they are
completely different worlds.”

The frustrations that were described by the participants impact the workflow within the
clinical practice of the work environment. RNs perceive that both the time factor and
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impact to care are important in the process of password use. Along with frustrations,
participants discussed the clinical concerns that arise when using passwords and
accessing the system of the electronic medical record.
Table 18
Clinical Concern
Participant Response
RN 10

“At this point, I would worry about if somebody would kind of get into
my password is utilizing it to way smart cards like that. Even when I do
sign off. I mean that’s the big worry in the hospital is job diversion and I
would be concerned that if somebody knows there is a way to waste in
computer system that will not need someone. Like if you wasted the med
station you would be able to focus that there is a way to do it through epic
that also wasted with, at the bed side? So, you don’t have to go to the
med station, however, if somebody had your password they would be able
to do that without you there. So, that’s the only thing I’ve noticed so far,
“You can do this here too?” So, if somebody did get someone’s password,
they would be able to simulate that person wasting on my card.”

RN 15

“It's usually like an emergency situation. Beginning with I work in ICU
so, patient is going on the tubes and they are hanging a bunch of bags like
pressers which keeps blood pressure up. They are just like, “Type this in
and try that we hang this or throw a set of vitals in for me real quick?”
because they are maybe doing God knows what. I mean if there are
expressions or something that should not be written down manually but
we might not have gotten to that point yet but we might be suffering the
dream we call it. We just want to start documenting but they have so
many other things they need to do.”

RN 2

“New hires as orientees do not get log-ins for quite a while and that poses
a problem for them that they could either do their patient care, or do their,
you know look up their labs, and get in the systems. So, that they can
actually look at orders without the preceptor actually doing it for them. I
guess they could, the preceptor could log in but, I think I would say, the
only benefit I could see for them doing this, is just for their ease of work.
With the preceptor not doing all the pieces but I do know that there is a
big challenge of getting people into the system to be able to join the
system.”
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These clinical concerns impact immediate access to information, ability to provide
clinical care, and employee participation as a team in information. Although these
concerns might be considered frustrations to some they were very clearly and emotionally
described as a concern, very differently than the frustraters. This theme was
differentiated based on researcher notes and cues from interview that identified the
content as a “concern” that would occur in the clinical area related to care and workflow
processes related to direct care. The scholarly literature shows that Albarrak (2012)
reported the password sharing at a rate of 33%, Fernández-Alemán et al. (2015) at a rate
of 31.7 %, and Medlin et al. (2008) at a rate of 73%. In these three studies, sharing of
passwords occurred with coworkers or colleagues and friends of their coworkers. In all
of the quantitative studies there is no insight into the reasons for sharing passwords. The
primary theme and subthemes reported here begin to reveal insight into the challenges
faced in the process of password and account use and why password and account sharing
might occur.
Primary Theme 3: Managing Password
Managing a password was reviewed in the scholarly literature as important to
maintaining IT security. Albarrak (2012), Belanger (2011), and Medlin et al. (2008) each
discussed the development of passwords and identified that users do not choose to create
strong passwords even though they have the knowledge. User preference is “ease of use”
(Belanger, 2011). In most situations, it is difficult to memorize a password that meets the
definition of complex, this leads to easy or familiar password creation (Medlin et al.,
2008). How RNs perceive the management of their password is important to understand
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based on the literature. This Primary theme contains the subthemes of password
development, remembering password, change password how often, password support,
action if someone knows password, worry about password.
Table 19
Primary Theme 3: Managing Password
Participant Response
RN 6

“I think it’s just remembering it and I wrote it in my phone. Because there
are so many passwords you have to remember. I mean there is the
pharmacy password, there is MyPay password, there is the TMS.”

RN 8

“I don’t give it out to anybody and most people are pretty good about
when you’re logging into the AcuDose they probably look the other way.
They try to respect your, the privacy of your password or I try to shield it
with hand, to shield with my body especially for things like narcotics.”

RN 11

“I try to memorize it not write it down. I usually stick between 2
passwords. So, when I’m prompted to change it in the system I’ll, you
know won’t forget if I change it to something totally different. I try to
keep them like they pertain to my life like pets or family members or
something like that.”

RN 20

“Just remember it.”

As described in several responses the RNs are trying to memorize the password,
write it down, and protect it from visualization. In all cases, they try to protect the
password in some way. Development descriptions were similar to those described in the
literature. Each participant made their password something familiar to them that they
would remember. They described that they would use something familiar, including
names of spouse, child, or pet, dates of birth, and other specific personal information or a
systematic approach that they would repeat. Several participants described following the
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system requirements while using familiar content. They reported that they would just use
an uppercase letter at the beginning, and a number, or special character behind their
familiar content.
Table 20
Password Development
Participant Response
RN 3

“Whatever instructions I’m given, that’s what I, how I change my
password or develop it. That’s another way I want to do it, but sometimes
if it tells me I have to have it in capital I do that with some digits.”

RN 6

“Digits, letters, characters, usually something that helps me, something
that is easy for me to remember. Usually kind of a birth date, a name.”

RN 10

“I try to make it something that I will remember. Usually some version of
my initials or something that I’ve used in the past, like a version of
something I’ve used in the past that reminds me my children or
something. I only have like 3 that I alternate and I have to change things
and it’s always one of those 3 versions.”

RN 15

“I came up with something that’s in the category, let's say colors so say I
decide to keep my base password, a color. So, it will be let's say blue.
Then the next time I'll need to change it I'll make it red. Then next time,
I'll change it to make it orange. So, it's always going to be a color,
something like that.
Then, if it asks me to change it’ll be like capital B and then blue, you
know because you have to have a capital and then blue. So, I know I'm
stating in a color scheme. Then the number, I might make it, say the year,
you know whatever year it is. Let's say its 2016 there will be blue 2016,
but if it got, yeah blue 2016, or Blue16.”

Remembering a password or committing it to a secure place for safekeeping is
something that I was very interested to hear about as the participants began to discuss
their approach to how they remember their password. The responses of committing the
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password to memory made me wonder about the complexity of the password but at no
time during the interview did I ask for or probe for a password. There were a few times
that I suspected a participant might share a password and I cautioned them that I did not
want them to share their password I only wanted to talk about the password.
Table 21
Remembering Password
Participant Response
RN 2

“Aside from writing it down, in the book that I carry in my pocket, I
usually try to remember my password. It’s usually when I come back or
you know if I am on vacation it’s when I have to try and remember it.”

RN 3

“I have it written down, but it’s kind of coded.”

RN 4

“I do not write it down here where I work, it’s not in my phone, it is
written at home.”

RN 9

“It’s just in my mind.”

RN 13

“I wrote it on the back on my badge so I don’t forget.”

Frequency of changing passwords contributes to overall security of an IT system.
In this subtheme, the responses demonstrate what happens with changing passwords over
time in the lived experience. 16 participants have not had to change passwords for long
periods of time. Those who have had to change passwords report that it causes confusion
because they have to use different passwords or variations then they have difficulty
remembering the password.
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Table 22
Change Password: How Often
Participant Response
RN 4

“I don’t change it frequently because in this situation we’re not asked to
change it frequently.”

RN 5

“Never.”

RN 7

“I don’t change it, because then I won’t remember it.”

RN 19

“Meditech you have to change it every couple of months. Regular
computer we never have to change it. They don’t make us.”

RNs are clinical and sometimes need support. They discussed who they believe is
the support they have for passwords when needed. As evidenced by one of the responses
here they are not always sure what the problem is, PC, software, or password.
Table 23
Password Support
Participant Response
RN 1

“I’ll call IT and they always give me a temporary one (password) and then
I create a new one.”

RN 12

“Sometimes you can call the help desk and get it(password) that way,
other times you have to go right through talk to somebody in IT security.
So, it’s not always the same person or the same way that you go around to
get a password.”

RN 15

“Sometimes IT help is needed to fix a password or computer or decide
which is the problem.”
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Other than purposefully sharing a password what would an RN do if they
discovered that someone knew their password? What level of urgency would there be in
an action? This subtheme provided insight into the actions that the RNs would take.
Many of the participants would require assistance in knowing how to get a password
changed.
Table 24
Action Taken if Someone Knows Password
Participant Response
RN 1

“I will change it.”

RN 6

“I probably won’t take any action. Because it changes with every 3
months.”

RN 15

“I would like to think that I would change it but then I don’t know that I
would. Like if a trusted friend I would probably just let it slide like I had
given it out. Maybe I felt somebody was or I know somebody did it.”

RN 18

“Not knowing who to even go to about changing my password, I’d
probably alert my manager first to receive some guidance at least about
where to go. So, that she was aware and look into possibly my password
being used for things that I didn’t do. But then IT would be contacted
promptly to really send me password so that I can actually log on.
That’s a really tough one to think about because even if it’s a night shift,
so I figured out someone knew my password. I don’t know if I would call
my manager at the middle of the night so I may continue to chart with my
password knowing that I could at least log in and know what I charted
versus what someone else could have put in.”

Fifteen of the participants would change their password either immediately or as
soon as they could figure out how to make the change. The other five would not take
action to change their password and considered it a low priority that did not seem to
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concern them. Given the concern for breach of password, potential for worry was a
theme that rose from several participants but was related to external passwords not work
related.
Table 25
Worry About Password
Participant Response
RN 1

“I’m always on the lookout but I don’t, I don’t worry because I really do
feel like people don’t want you to take their passwords. So, I don’t think
they would want to take my password. I think it’s a mutual understanding
respect.”

RN 3

“Yes, but it’s, I worry about it but I know I have a secure password at
least from what I feel. But I always know that somebody somehow could
in some remote way still hack into an account that I have, even though I
have a password for it that I feel secure.”

RN 6

“I worry that I’ll forget it, like after I’m off for an extended period of time
then if you forget it you can’t get in or else if that 3-month period has
gone by and you’re logged out and you can’t remember it, you can always
go to help desk.”

RN 9

“For work, no, banking yes.”

Fourteen of the participants do not worry at all about their passwords at work.
Those who do worry about it have low levels of worry related to media publications and
placed more worry on their personal accounts such as banking and credit.
Primary Theme 4: Orientation
The primary theme of orientation had four subthemes emerge that were analyzed
including annual education, recent IT security, IT security talk on your unit, and
participation in IT policy review on your unit.
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Table 26
Primary Theme 4: Orientation
Participant Response
RN 2

“In the orientation part of this you know that the flow of electronic
medical records is really new.
The overall orientation piece on the first orientation we did how do I track
records. But as new systems come up we usually manage those. We are
going to go through all the elements of those. So, I can say with each
system I would probably have been oriented to that particular system and
all you need to do will be getting in all of them.
You know sometimes, especially with the when you first start using it, it’s
difficult to know like exactly how you logged on. Sometimes you were
just you know just take off, just log off like you would normally do with
any other computer application without realizing its so different when you
do that within the track records. So, I think it’s just plain orientations as
you have new systems come up have them going and you have to get
through too many systems. “

RN 5

“They do tell you to secure your stuff, don’t walk away from your
computer, log off, but it’s not realistic.”

RN 6

“That you need to sign off when you walk away from the computer not to
leave your PIV cards, not to leave your PIV card in the computer. It’s a
personal identification vehicle or something like that and it has a chip in it
or putting in the computer.”

RN 17

“Oh! Sure, I mean there is paper you have to sign understanding that this
was to you and you are bound to maintain its privacy, you aren’t to give it
to anyone. All that I remember that vividly it was ingrained. Then as
layers have come on, we had to do that again. Like when AcuDose came
in we had to sign another paper saying this is yours.”

Eight participants responded that there was no IT system when they started in
nursing and the systems came along after they were working so they got oriented as the
systems went live or they got no orientation and training. Two reported that they had
more detailed orientations with med scanning and medical record review and the final 10
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participants having reported that they had limited variations of password and or log-off
security measures as their orientation. Annual education was reported as a frequent type
of either IT education or IT security but was reported as brief in content. Participants
described annual education and episodic education as more common and memorable.
Table 27
Education: Annual
Participant Response
RN 1

“There are modules for annual training.”

RN 5

“Each year there is some kind of on line training that has computer
training or a refresher of some sort. I believe it talks about log-off.”

RN 12

“But we do have each year, we have education that we have to do online
regarding confidentiality of emails and your passwords and like IT kind of
security. That’s usually a yearly thing.”

Recent IT security education was identified by seven participants, five who
discuss on-line modules or ULearn type of education. The two RNs who mentioned they
had mandatory education could not specify if there was IT security information within
that education. Thirteen RNs had no recent education.
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Table 28
IT Security: Recent
Participant Response
RN 15

“The hospital has had us, I’d say in the past year do security education
modules on the computer. Which requires a password that I can absolutely
never, I can tell you the hospital tells you what your password is.
It says, to put in your employee number then it tells you what your
password will be by telling you to enter your hospital identifier code.
Then your password and it’s your social security so that’s the password
that you really don’t have to remember because the hospital tells you what
it is when you are entering in to that. But we have had education models
on IT security.”

RN 17

“The mandatory education that we do, that’s all.”

RN 5

“No, I don’t think, there might have been a blurb about it in our chart
nurse class, but I don’t really remember it being anything significant.”

RN 9

“Not to my knowledge, but there is a bunch of you learns going on right
now that I haven’t completed. So, sometimes that will capture something
new that’s happening.”

RNs discussed the education of IT security, or the lack of such, and the unit talk
of IT security. Fifteen participants had no talk on their units of IT security at all, five did
have IT security talk creating this subtheme. One of those discussions was related to IT
security frustrations.
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Table 29
IT Security Talk on Your Unit
Participant Response
RN 9

“Only when there was that pretty big breach a couple of years ago, and
even that’s the only thing that really brought it up. But it’s not a daily
conversation.”

RN 5

“Yes, we have, there is one committee that deals with our IT staff, I’ve
been able to call them. We get updates on that once a month in our emails
and stuff and if anything changes we have education about that.”

RN 12

“The only time it’s talked about is if we have a new nurse or a traveler
start and they don’t have their IDs. Especially it’s normally requested at
least 2 weeks in advance. But the day they start they can’t access anything
and it takes hours to take their password up and running. It’s especially
difficult for travelers because they only get a 2-day orientation to the unit.
They spend half their day trying to get their password and that’s that time
wasted.”

RN 14

“Not really, not security so much as frustration of getting in and you
know, getting in is a problem it’s like you always have the log in, log in,
log in. But there is no way around that. You know that’s what it is. Our
discussion.”

Renaud and Goucher (2012) discussed that the likelihood of employees reading
policies without encouragement and engagement by management is unlikely. Policy
practice and implementation takes management interaction, education, and oversight and
in many cases involvement to assure that the employee is engaged in the process and
knows the information. In this subtheme, all participants share responses of no policy
review for any kind of IT security or security practices for their unit. One participant
responds that they make a periodic review in the department of an already established
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policy so that they are aware of the contents for appropriate cell phone use and other
devices on work property.
Table 30
Participate in IT Policy Review
Participant Response
RN 5

“No, I don’t even think that’s an opportunity for, I mean that I’m aware
of.”

RN 10

“No, but I have been reporting the issues that are a concern that I have
about or someone would have someone else’s password that could raise
an issue for colleagues about that.”

RN 17

“No, just reviewing it with the staff because there were concerns about
people sharing information on social media kind of stuff. I mean we’ve
done that, we’ve done a staff review of about what you are allowed to
have share and what you are not allowed to share. I guess some issues that
were pretty good so, we have review policies as a unit, go over. Share
what's identifiable, what it’s not.”

The participant responses related to orientation and each of the subthemes of education
and policy participation represent many gaps in engagement with IT security. RNs
respond with little experience or recall related to IT security detail in each of the themes.
Primary Theme 5: Call Who With IT Question
This primary theme identifies basic IT knowledge and engagement. The
knowledge begins with the elements of simple connections to information of support for
IT security to the clinical area and clinical personnel when needed. Do the RNs know
who to reach out to when they have questions or concerns about IT security.
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Table 31
Primary Theme 5: Call Who With IT Question
Participant Response
RN 4

“I would call, we have a main help desk call or line we can call, it’s 24/7
would help me.”

RN 9

“I would probably call the help desk first. I know there is a security
officer, I’d have to investigate on how to get a hold of them. But I really
couldn’t tell you who it is.”

RN 15

“I know I should know this answer because it's part of the education
module. But I don’t know very specific name or title at this point. I know
yearly I do the module and then I quickly forget it because I never need to
know it. But I would have, I would probably go to clinical director first to
remind me who that person is or the director of our unit and then they will
point me in the right direction. Or I could always call a help desk to, like
if there is something later that I want to know immediately I'm sure they
can point me in the right direction.”

RN 16

“I would call the computer tech person. I'm not sure what that person’s
title is but I think maybe I think a computer tech person. I would call that
person and ask him or her what to do.”

All participants would either call the help desk or IT personnel. There were four
participants who were not completely sure who to call if they had concerns or a question
and they deferred to their clinical leaders first for direction.
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Table 32
Whose Role for IT Security
Participant Response
RN 2

“I think it’s really everybody’s responsibility but if you see that there is an
issue, they need you to confront it, or they need you to report it. So, I
think it’s kind of everybody’s job but I know that there are some people
that are ultimately responsible for that like the privacy officer in IT and
those types of things. So, I think it’s like everybody.”

RN 11

“Definitely the IT department, clinical engineering. I’m sure help desk
would probably be involved.”

RN 1

“Well, I think it should be your hospital system, they have to make sure
that it is able to be accessed by only authorized users. I think that it’s my
role to protect my actual access. But I think as a whole it should be your
IT department from your hospital to prevent outsiders from trying to get
in.”

RN 7

“I don’t know, we just call the helpdesk for everything. So, I’m not
exactly sure who maintains the security but.”

Participants responded in six categories for who was responsible for IT security
and some included several within their same response. Responsibilities identified were
for everyone (4), the hospital (2), IT (10), my responsibility (2), record security analyst
(1), the RN (3), and not sure (1). Those who responded that it was “my responsibility” or
the RN, suggested that it was their responsibility to maintain only their access with their
password secure. During discussion of maintaining system security respondents
identified various levels of concern that system is not secure.
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Table 33
Concern System is Not Secure
Participant Response
RN 1

“I was a little concerned when that breach did occur I don’t know the full
details of it. I do know that it was one incident and not system wide. But I
do think that the hospital took it extremely seriously and worked with
caution in preventing it from happening again.”

RN 15

“Actually, it's secure, the only vulnerability I can see is just through
human error you know that I'm probably guilty of is by leaving my
computer open and that’s the only way I can think of. I don’t know how
and it seems to me like I don’t know that it's or anything although I do
know the physician can access all the information too. So, I guess it is
open to the web so I guess it's technically open to vulnerability if it's on
the web. But I assume we have now security team taking care of us.”

RN 18

“Sure yeah. Having some close family members in information
technology that have been visited sometimes at work knowing that our
operating system is a little bit older and isn’t supported at this point by
Microsoft. That's a concern and that’s really the biggest one. Other than
that, sometimes the badging situation can be of concern if people lend
their badges out to go get coffees. Or lend their badges out to get to
medication room or something like that. So, if they logged in once with
their passwords that the badge can find into any computer with just
tapping it on by the computer.”

RN 8

“I don’t know that any system is secure anymore, I mean everybody is
getting hacked, I mean the big hospital system I work in was a victim of
being hacked. Every time you turn around someone is being hacked. Or I
don’t know, I think the more every security thing we develop there is
someone who is just that much smarter and finds a way around.”

RN 9

“I don’t think anything is secure in today’s world anymore. Like my
banking account got hacked, my credit card got hacked, my little kitty
credit card hacked. I was having charges all over the place. So, I don’t
think anything is really secure, I really don’t.”
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Although the majority of participants (14) believed the system is secure. The six who
were concerned about security of system had some experience wither directly or
indirectly with a system problem or breach. If there was a concern or report of an IT
issue was the participant’s confidence maintained.
Table 34
Confidence That Concern is Taken Seriously
Participant Response
RN 11

“Yes, they are very good with addressing any concerns that we have.”

RN 17

“Oh! yeah. I felt that there was not the same timely response we would
expect to issues. Because I thought that this was pretty serious like “Hair
is on fire” we need to deal with this now and they were like, “Yeah we
know.”

RN 18

“Yes, every time we call them they actually have to open up a ticket and it
gives us an email saying that the tickets’ been opened. Then it’ll tell us
when the ticket’s been closed meaning that everything should be
resolved.”

RN 20

“I think it depends on who answers the call on the help desk, it depends
on the staff member that I would get in touch with.”

Within this subtheme 19 participants expressed that they had confidence and one
answered that “it depends on who answers at the help desk”. The depth of the connection
with confidence seemed to be at the help desk level. This is the level of connection for
the RNs to IT security.
Primary Theme 6: Rate Security
Within this Primary theme of rate security, there are subthemes of are you
expected to know IT security, is your job better with IT security, and what is your
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teammates practice. The perception of security level that the RN is exposed to along with
sense of job improvement impact the expressed intention of the RNs application of IT
security.
Table 35
Primary Theme 6: Rate Security
Participant Response
RN 2

“I feel like that data is probably pretty secure but out and about I’m not
sure. Because anyone can really look at the screens. I mean as you walk
by if you really wanted to you can look at the things so something like
that. You know based on, how kind of area that you're in, it’s probably the
level different levels things just on the screen. I think different places in
the clinical area probably more secure like the conference rooms are fairly
secure. The nurse’s station, maybe a medium level because the traffic
through there. You have different types of people who go through the
nurses’ station, nursing positions, different disciplines. They kind of walk
through nurse’s station and not the hallways, which I feel are pretty open
with visitors and all types of persons. So, I think that’s probably not as
secure in the other areas.”

RN 13

“I would say it’s mid-scale.”

RN 14

“I think 8 out of 10, the people that are being careful but they are not
ultra-worried about it.”

RN 18

“If 10 is very secure and 1 is not very secure I would say my unit would
probably be 6 in my opinion.”

Ratings have to do with location and access of unit. This perception is about real
time access to computer screens and computers. Two respondents rated their unit at the
highest rating saying they would be 10 out of 10 or most secure. All others (18) said they
would be moderate to moderately high secure because they are very careful with HIPAA
but they do leave their computers and they had not really thought about several aspects of
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password development prior to this interview. Consistent with the flow of discussion this
subtheme of the RN being expected to know IT security emerged.
Table 36
Are You Expected to Know IT Security
Participant Response
RN 7

“No, I mean not the details, nitty-gritty but I mean maintaining a
password and making sure that no one has access and to that extend yes.”

RN 8

“I think we should know the basics, how to protect yourself, you know,
protect your patient’s information.”

RN 15

“I don’t know that we need to know the ins and outs of it but I know we
are expected to as far as we are concerned and using the system to try to
keep it secure.”

RN 19

“The only aspect that I would be expected to do is have a secure password
and log off the stuff. Other than that, we wouldn’t be required to know
how to do it.”

Eight respondents identified that they should know some IT security but did not
or were not able to define what that would include. They suggested they should know
some basics or password safety. I had wondered if that answer was based on the content
of the interview. The remaining 12 respondents did not believe they had a need to know
IT security.
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Table 37
Is Your Job Better With More Security
Participant Response
RN 6

“It doesn’t make my job better but it keeps information private. I would
think that the patient’s information would be a better chance of it
remaining private.”

RN 13

“I feel like if it was more secure it would make my job harder, I would
spend more time on that rather than patient care and that would not
necessarily be better. But if there is a way they can make it secure and fast
then it would be different.”

RN 16

“I think I’d definitely feel more comfortable. I think feeling more
comfortable will make me feel more confident and then I'll perform best I
can.”

RN 20

“I don’t know if it would change specifically nursing practice just making
things better, would make the patient safer so then, yeah, I would think
that would make my job better.”

None of the participants said that IT security would directly make their job better
but eight said that it would make them more confident or make the patients safer and then
indirectly make their job better. Given the perception of impact on their job because of
IT security, the next subtheme that emerged impacting the RNs job was teammates
practice.

130
Table 38
Teammates Practice
Participant Response
RN 5

“Like I said before we all share our badges to sign on to the computers to
chart stuff, work, we’re in the room and we’re already logged on and to
our patients something is happening and you need more help in the room
and they’ll come on, if I am already logged on because I’m in there, then
they’ll just start charting under my account or something.”

RN 12

“I believe that if that would make our job easier, they would share them I do share them.”

RN 17

“There might be a few that are careless because they are careless in many
things.”

RN 20

“Right, yeah, I mean I’ve definitely overheard people sharing their
information it’s not necessarily to log into the record, but its, “Hey, can
you check my PTO or can you log in to check if my paycheck was
deposited.” Usually the same log in you use for all of that is the same that
you would use for the charting system. In theory, they could log in under
you in the charting system too. So, it’s kind of a bridge.”

Responses include nine that identify they are aware of sharing among their peers,
three that are aware of badge scanning shared accounts, and five that believe there is no
sharing of passwords or accounts within their departments among teammates.
Primary Theme 7: Association With Hacking
There are three subthemes in the primary theme of association with hacking. The
three subthemes are impact to employees, impact to patients, and impact to organizations.
The standard responses within the primary theme of association with hacking seemed to
be rambling intertwining information from personal concern to work and inclusive of
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mainstream media mania. Several participants admitted “I just don’t know…” as they
discussed hacking.
Table 39
Primary Theme 7: Association With Hacking
Participant Response
RN 15

“Somewhere I know like I said I don’t know how the ins and outs of
system actually works. But I'm sure smarter minds of mine with more
technical survey can maybe back engineer or reverse engineer into a
system but I don’t know how that works. I don’t know how to do that
myself.”

RN 16

“I mean we don’t really know everybody we work with, we think we
might but you have to protect yourself at all times in the world we live in.
I just think that it's just a responsibility of each person. If hacking happens
I think some of these careless things could really cause that to go on. We
have to be just cautious all the time.”

RN 17

“I don’t know enough about that hacking, how that occurs, I assume that
if you are not careful it would be well likely that someone would use it.
From a hacking perspective but I really think the hacker people aren’t like
nurses taking care of patients in general but again maybe that’s the
delusion.”

RN 18

“If another coworker knows someone else’s password, it could do a lot of
detrimental things. Be it just sabotaging that nurse’s documentation or
undoing documentation that was done. Or possibly charting things that
weren’t true or weren’t done.”

Thoughts about hacking are not based on anything deeper than changing patient
records or what is known about HIPAA and patient privacy. There was no response
included about social engineering or actual hacking principles. With this as a premise the
subthemes of impact developed related to hacking
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Table 40
Impact to Employees
Participant Response
RN 1

“I think the impact would be fear and I think that people would be
probably a little more protective of their own private access, yeah.”

RN 17

“I think it would be terrible. I think that I would just probably take the
system down for a while and we are terrible at down time. Because we’ve
got to rely so much on computer even though I liked paper. We are no
longer set up to run in a paper world so it would be really hard.
I get the extent of the hack would be, the extent of the effect. If it took the
system down for days and that would be rebuilt from who knows where if
we lost data, it's irretrievable as far as I could see. I could not have to
chart on someone 2 days after I took care of them.”

RN 18

“I think there could be disciplinary action up to termination depending on
the circumstances of how the password got taken.”

RN 19

“It depends on what information was hacked, you know if the get your
financial stuff they can get information about your bank accounts, taxes.
Most of us have direct deposits or even our social security numbers are in
there too.”

The RNs have a strong sense that there are consequences to hacking and are
expressive that hacking is detrimental to employees. With continued discussions of
consequences related to hacking the RNs passionately discussed aspects of potential
impact to employees and patients as if they were intertwined. In several cases the RNs
spoke about themselves using the hospital for themselves and their families for healthcare
thus identifying the blurred lines between employee and patient as they see themselves as
both within the same organization.
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Table 41
Impact to Patients
Participant Response
RN 3

“Very impactful, their medical record it’s the highest regard of privacy
and we should respect that and in no way, jeopardize their sense that their
health information is secure.”

RN 11

“Gosh! That would probably be a nightmare. As a nurse, you look at your
orders and you go off of your orders. Say for example the hacker would
get into e-record and put like this bogus orders and that can definitely put
your patient at risk or some serious injury.”

RN 14

“I guess they would be able to change records, you know to change your
data. Would patients have confidence?”

RN 16

“Oh! I just think HIPAA would be out the window for one thing. Patient
information would go to hands where it shouldn’t be going. I think it
would be disastrous.”

Again, the RNs have a strong sense that there are consequences to hacking and
are expressive that hacking is detrimental to patients. While their focus is on patient
information and the consequence of hacking on patient information they did make a
correlation to patient trust in the care givers and the hospital. The RNs also made a
connection to the hackers’ abilities to gain patient personal identifiers and being able to
capture that information for use to gain the patient identity for misuse. Some expressed
public concern for hacking similar to what Kwon & Johnson (2014) described about
public awareness and concern of hacking are becoming more prominent.
The RNs expressed that the consequences to the organization would be significant
and detrimental in all aspects including public relations, community, business, financial,
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health plan relationships, and many other aspects. Those who are employees to
organizations who would face this type of hacking felt he or she would personally be
affected. In all cases, they reported the effects would be disparaging.
Table 42
Impact to Organizations
Participant Response
RN 3

“Very detrimental, its end results would be detrimental to the patients, to
the staff and publicity wise it would be negative publicity.”

RN 11

“I would definitely think, thinking the benefits I get from my hospital like
healthcare, my salary if they were to kind of meddle with that in the
public and community that could basically ruin my life. They would be
stealing my salary and my healthcare benefits. So, it certain would be
catastrophic.”
“It would be bad. Bad name. I can’t think of the word, but bad PR or bad
messages to the outside community that you know it’s not safe.”

RN 14
RN 20

“Loss of trust from the community, because there is that expectation that
their information is secure especially things like health information. So,
you would definitely lose that trust from people.”

Primary Theme 8: Other Security Thoughts
Other security thoughts came from an open-ended question that allowed the participants
to discuss other IT topics that may be connected to this questionnaire or security of IT in
general. There were no subthemes within this primary theme
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Table 43
Primary Theme 8: Other Security Thoughts
Participant Response
RN 1

“Well, I mean even like IT security nowadays people can badge in for the
doors, for parking, for food. We actually had an incident where somebody
lost their badge but it was still getting used. They actually tracked the
doors it went through and that’s how they ended up finding it. I guess it
was somebody trying to get to the information desk. But they still used
that badge.”
“I’m just kind of curious that you pick up the phone, you call someone
and they get in on your account, there is no verification that who you’re
speaking with is actually someone legit.”

RN 6

RN 11

“I would just say maybe, like the point where I gave you where the people
that have used to work on the unit now work elsewhere, but they still
come back and work. If there could be some kind of, I don’t want to say
universal password, but they should still be able to come and get into the
system if they come back to work, in their old unit.”

RN 20

“I always wonder what, how they determine the amount of time between
password changes, why do they say it needs to be every 35 days or why
does it need to be every 60 days? I mean do they just pull that number out
of the air or is that backed up by something? I always wonder that.”

This category of thoughts was helpful to consider other security issues and serves
to help with future research ideas and those security issues that bother nurses related to IT
security. This category of information may be helpful in operational situations related to
security gap assessments. Additional topics included point of care testing scanning and
badge sharing for ease of use, mobile devices used in workflow and how they help or
inhibit workflow, different vendor systems and how they do not interact
(interoperability), and other badge access uses.
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There were no identified discrepant cases that were factored into the analysis.
Member checking, adequate analysis of data, absence of researcher bias, and minimizing
conflict of interest reduce the opportunity for discrepant responses (Peredaryenko &
Krauss, 2013).
Evidence of Trustworthiness
Credibility
The qualitative case study method allowed for construct validity to be established
through evidence from the chain of sources described by Amerson (2011), including
member checking, pattern matching, explanation building and using logic models. The
participants’ ability to discuss and reiterate the important aspects of the informed consent
while meeting prior to the interview and the member checking activities were two very
important aspects of credibility. Engagement was critical to a successful interview and
part of my role was to take notes, of which the participant was notified prior to the start.
If I noticed that the participant was distracted in any way by my notetaking, I would stop
during the interview and later jot notes following the interview conclusion so as not to
interfere with the participants thought and concentration. Immediately following each
interview, I would make any notes required and record additional thoughts and
impressions that I had gathered from my insights of responses that I might have had of
the participants expressed feelings or engagement mannerisms so that I could apply that
information into the memo section of NVivo v11. These notes served to help clarify
accuracy in transcription and questions that arose during member checking by myself and
the members.
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Transferability
The interview questionnaire was submitted to an expert panel prior to use and was
revised and validated for the study increasing the relevance to the study, appropriateness
to the topic, accuracy in content, and clarity to the population. Bengtsson (2016)
discussed the importance of validating the questionnaire through the use of an expert
panel in the process of qualitative research, as it lends credibility to the process. The
constructs of UTAUT served as the foundation for the research questions. The use of
UTAUT allowed for an established protocol incorporated into the study design and
became the supportive structure for external validity of this qualitative case study
(Amerson, 2011). The framework of UTAUT and each of the constructs being used
within this research study were established and validated and did support the work in this
research study. Thomas and Magilvy (2011) discussed that transferability of a study is
applying research findings from one group or population to another. The findings from
this study are expected to have applicability to other clinical populations within the
healthcare arena.
Dependability
Dependability was assured through comparative hand notes taken during the
interview and the audio recordings that were recorded and transcribed verbatim with
review following transcription. The researcher conducted repeated reviews of the audio
recordings. The purpose of the repeated reviews was to improve interpretation and
identify cues related to the lived experience that will be shared. These were compared to
the notes related to expressed feelings and engagement attempting to capture the
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associated lived experiences that were not verbally described but were expressed
nonverbally. All elements of data collected, researcher notes, audio recordings, and
transcripts, were input to NVivo v11 software so that accurate and dependable results
were analyzed.
Confirmability
Confirmability was maintained during the interview process, coding, and
analyzing process of the study. The neutrality of the qualitative study, is achieved when
each of the following have been addressed according to Noble and Smith (2015); (a) truth
value, (b) consistency, and (c) applicability. This was often difficult to maintain during
the interview process because of the casual nature of the interviews. Knowing the
importance of confirmability, I would review ahead of each interview and remind myself
to stay focused on the participant’s story. This assisted me in maintaining my neutral
position when topics arose with any link to a philosophical position, or experience that
might be associated or similar to mine that triggered an instinct to discuss or respond.
The multiple reviews of the recordings also helped to reveal, eliminate, or separate, any
personal response during review, coding, or analysis of the data. Careful and thoughtful
bracketing was used during the coding phase of data analysis. The bracketing for this
study was conducted according to Tufford and Newman (2012), and Sorsa et al. (2015),
on several different levels and very thoughtfully to allow for reflexivity and
understanding. Each phase of the data analysis required a thoughtful and nonjudgmental
processes to assure neutrality.
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Saturation
The qualitative study is enhanced when internal validity is supported with
saturation (Fusch & Ness, 2015). The population of this study included 20 participants.
Data saturation occurred at participant 14 with emergence of common themes and
subthemes concluding. According to Fusch and Ness, saturation is reached when there is
no new information, no new coding, no new themes, and an ability to replicate the study.
Although saturation had been reached at 14 participants the additional six participants
enhanced the data rich responses obtained and became “balancers” of subthemes that had
emerged. Meaning was enhanced because of the additional respondents in some
categories to assure that they were subthemes rather than primary themes. The last six
participants added to the responses equalizing and enhancing thematic developments.
Study Results
The eight primary themes and all subthemes that had emerged were discussed in
the data analysis section above. Each of the first six primary themes have UTAUT
constructs that are coordinated with that theme, see Figure 3. This study was designed to
answer the overarching research question, what are RNs’ perceptions, expressed
intentions, and self-reported behaviors of IT security? I was able to answer this question
by first answering each of the supporting questions.
RQ 1
RQ 1: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors
of the performance expectancy of IT security practice?
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To answer this research question related to the performance expectancy the
emerged primary and subthemes from primary themes 2, 3, 5, and 6 were used. The RN
perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors include a mixed use of
performance expectancy of IT security practice. The RNs self-reported role in the usage
of security practices is dependent on the situation in the clinical environment. The RNs
found it easy to use passwords but frustrating to repeatedly log-in using a password when
required. The RNs did not share passwords but there was a subset that shared accounts
through a modern method of sharing through badge swipe sharing. No password
exchange is required but the badge, registered for authentication via single sign on (SSO),
is shared between RNs for workflow efficiencies. The belief that the RNs’ have is that
the process will help them maintain aspects of their job that pertain to expediting the
patient care process, enhance medical record documentation, and did not see it as a
system security concern. The RNs did not identify that there would be a direct
improvement in their job but they did describe that if security made things better for the
patient then indirectly it would be better. Exploration of how the RNs’ perceived their
role in IT security showed that they were not well connected with the IT support and did
not have a strong understanding of who was or should be responsible for IT security at
the front line or at the organization. The perception of security was at least midlevel or
higher in all work units even though RNs reported that their teammates shared passwords
and did not log-off of their computers when they walk away. The use of security
practices was described as relatively easy to use but were not put into place as part of the
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regular workflow. The workplace in each unit is influenced by the security practices and
may be impacted by these practices.
RQ 2
RQ 2: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors
of the effort expectancy related to the IT security practice?
To answer this research question related to the effort expectancy the emerged
primary and subthemes from primary themes 2 and 3 were used. Effort expectancy is
associated with how easy it is to use the security practices. There were no aspects of
security discussed by the participants that were described as difficult to use. There were
aspects of inconvenience, frustration, interference with care, and plain annoying. The
identified RN perception related to the security practices and ease of use have a direct
correlation with the utilization of those security practices that describes the ability for
reporting no sharing of passwords. Nineteen of twenty of the RNs reporting in this study
use the SSO badge programed authentication for log-in. The SSO allows for ease of login for a large number of systems that the RNs access. The aspect of difficulty is
accessing records and information as rapidly with multiple RNs while immediate or
critical situations occur, those were the times when deviations from security practices
were reported.
RQ 3
RQ 3: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors
of the social influence related to the IT security practice?
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To answer this research question related to the effort expectancy the emerged
primary and subthemes from primary themes 1, 2, and 6 were used. Social influence is
the method for which the employee perceives their peers or significant other relevant
professionals in the clinical environment believe they should be using the security
practices. Within this study, the RNs described that the teammates they work with did
walk away from their computers without log-off and they do share passwords, however
they themselves discussed their behaviors which were different. The practice of walking
away from the computer without log-off was described as a cultural norm. The RNs
described that they would not personally share a password. The RNs’ perception of
social influence in the clinical setting related to varying levels of social support which
permits a cultural norm of computer walk away with no log-off, mishandling of accounts
by badge sharing, and other security issues.
RQ 4
RQ 4: What are RN perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors
of the facilitating conditions of the IT security practice?
To answer this research question related to the facilitating conditions the emerged
primary and subthemes from primary themes 1, 2, 4, and 6 were used. The RNs
discussed the operational support of each other as a strong facilitating condition that led
to breach of IT security. Facilitating conditions, as perceived by the RNs, included the
technical methods that support using the security practices. The safeguards in place to
protect security IT including the auto log-off on the computers for those who walk away
without log-off was identified as an inhibitor to patient care because it required frequent
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log-in ultimately causing delays to care. The other facilitating condition that is applied to
the IT security used by RNs is SSO. The emerged theme identified that SSO was used to
breach IT security by sharing authenticated badges for account sharing, med room access,
and facility purchases. Orientation and education were limited so would not be
considered as a facilitation of conditions. The RNs did not participate and were not
engaged in policy development. Overall engagement with IT for support was limited as
well creating another aspect of limitation toward facilitating conditions.
RQ: Overarching
With each of the supporting questions answered, the overarching question can
now be answered. What are RNs’ perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported
behaviors of IT security? RNs perceptions of IT security include a very basic level of
what security definitions include aside from privacy and HIPAA. The expressed
intentions of the RN population responding to this study included a positive desire to do
what would protect themselves, the organization, and most importantly the patients they
care for. The self-reported behaviors of the RNs included mishandling of IT security
through walking away from the computer without log-off, poor development of
passwords, lack of password change for long periods of time, sharing of accounts through
SSO authenticated badges, and sharing log-on information for mobile and point of care
equipment.
I have cross walked the UTAUT constructs used in this study along with the
primary and subthemes that emerged from data analysis. By using this method, a robust
review of the lived experience of the RNs’ perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-
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reported behaviors of IT security practices was conducted. This review allows for insight
into the security practice in the healthcare work environment.
The inquiry and collection of demographic data was specifically designed to align
with the literature that has been established including variances between male and
female, age, and educational preparation. In the literature review, each of these
demographic items had been shown to have a relationship to adoption of technology and
change (Venkatesh, 2003). These demographic items were not found in the data analysis
to play a role in nor have a relationship to the emergence of the primary or subthemes
within this study. I was unable to make any direct alignment from demographic data to
the construct themes of UTAUT aimed toward use behavior.
Summary
Albarrak (2012) , Fernández-Alemán et al. (2015), and Medlin et al. (2008) each
showed mishandling of IT security in their quantitative studies. The use of exploration
with the case study format in this study allowed for findings that add to the knowledge of
IT security handling in clinical settings. The RNs’ perceptions, expressed intentions, and
self-reported behaviors of IT security was able to be applied with insight into their lived
experience of using the IT security within their clinical setting. A discussion of the
interpretation of research findings, limitations of the study, recommendations for future
research, and implications for positive social change is presented within Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore the perception of the
registered nurse (RN) within four of the constructs of the unified theory of acceptance
and usage of technology (UTAUT) that are specific to use behavior (Venkatesh et al.,
2003). Insight into the lived experiences of RNs related to information technology (IT)
security was the benefit of this study. The experiences and perceptions of the RNs were
analyzed as they relate to the UTAUT constructs of performance expectancy, effort
expectancy, social influence, and facilitating conditions. Using UTAUT as the
theoretical framework, the following overarching research question was used for this
study: What are RNs’ perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors of IT
security? The findings included that RNs’ perceptions of IT security include a very basic
level of IT security definition aside from privacy and HIPAA. Their expressed intentions
included a positive desire to act in a manner that would protect themselves, the
organization, and most importantly the patients they care for. The self-reported behaviors
of the RNs include mishandling of IT security through several venues, including walking
away from the computer without log-off, poor development of passwords, lack of
password change for long periods of time, sharing of accounts through single sign on
(SSO) authenticated badges and sharing of those authenticated badges, and sharing logon information for mobile and point of care equipment. Within Chapter 5, I address the
interpretations, implications, and potential applications of the findings along with
limitations and conclusions of the work as well as avenues for future research. Finally,
implications for social change are discussed.
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Interpretation of Findings
The findings included that RNs’ perceptions of IT security include a very basic
level of IT security definition aside from privacy and HIPAA. Their expressed intentions
included a positive desire to act in a manner that would protect themselves, the
organization, and most importantly the patients they care for. The self-reported behaviors
of the RNs include mishandling of IT security through several venues including walking
away from the computer without log-off, poor development of passwords, lack of
password change for long periods of time, sharing of accounts through SSO authenticated
badges and sharing of those authenticated badges, and sharing log-on information for
mobile and point of care equipment.
The RNs expressed trust of their teammates and offered discussion of protecting
their environments, almost justifying no log-off and sharing of accounts or badges. This
is consistent with research by Box and Pottas (2013) who discussed the general
functioning of healthcare professionals is naturally within an honorable and trusting
community. Those healthcare professionals, because of their trusting nature, have a low
need for security sensitivity leaving them with a limited sense of need for IT security
awareness.
The majority of RNs discussed the use of SSO. But even with SSO, they still had
additional application for which they were required to have additional and separate
passwords for authentication. Milenković et al. (2013), discussed the issue of users
having to remember multiple passwords and that would most likely cause the creation of
insecure passwords, forgetting passwords, or cause wasting time with multiple
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authentications. Findings supported this with identification of password development
occurring from familiar categories with rare to no password change. Systems including
Pixis and AcuDose, both dispensing systems most often used for medications, were
reported to have 2-step authentication of password and biometric access (fingerprint).
Password and biometric authentication were both methods described of gaining access to
systems securely (Li et al., 2014).
Password sharing was not discovered within this study among the participants.
However, they did share their lived experiences of password sharing scenarios having
occurred on their units among teammates. They described actual workflow and patient
situations that they believed might be a reason for password sharing. Albarrak (2012),
Belanger (2011), Cazier and Medlin (2006), Rajarajan et al. (2014), Sharma and
Sugumaran (2011), and Tam et al. (2010) all discussed the difficulty of protecting the
organization relying on a password. They suggested that it is the people who must be the
strength of the IT security. From an organizational perspective, the IT system is
composed of three parts: technology, management, and the people (Cheng et al., 2013).
The people or employees remain the weakest link in security and password management
even though there have been strides in technology systems (Medlin et al., 2008; & Tam et
al., 2010).
The RNs found it to be a cultural norm to walk away from a computer without
log-off. They reported that not only did they do it to care for their patients and to do
other clinical tasks but they also reported that their teammates within their unit do it. The
front-line culture of the organizations represented in this study has either allowed or
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evolved to a position that there is a low-level response to IT security. Kwon and Johnson
(2014) demonstrated that there were three levels of security practice adoption based on
culture: leaders, followers, and laggers. Those identified organizations were noted as
leaders were training and managing risk and breach incidents. The RNs in this study
reported that they did not recall much IT security orientation, they have very little IT
security training and education other than annual mandatory training for which they had
little recall of the IT security within that training, and they had no talk of IT security on
their units.
Evaluating and managing the human factors is one of the key aspects of IT
security. Human factors are frequently mentioned in the literature when discussing IT
security and often through history have been referred to as the weakest link (Arce, 2003,
Ferguson et al., 2011, Tam et al., 2010). Negligence is often cited as a human factor that
affects the organization. Negligence can fall into several categories of security risk.
Kruger and Anschutz (2013) discussed the insider negligence at the root of data breaches.
Kwon and Johnson (2014) discussed that the healthcare industry faces two weak links the
internal threat and the external threat. Two weak links exist because healthcare has not
adequately ramped up to deal with the security risks through investment allowing for
remainders of uncertainty.
I found that the RNs had moderate awareness of IT security and that their
awareness was targeted toward HIPAA and protecting the electronic medical record.
They were certainly also aware that there was an obligation to authenticate through
password or SSO to gain access to any application or the electronic medical record.
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Harris and Furnell (2012) had previously identified the same that the employees of
organizations have been found to have only moderate to low awareness when asked about
behaviors required for security compliance. Albarrak (2012) found that nurses were
deficient in security awareness and the importance of overall IT security in relation to
patient data.
Throughout the preparation for this study, the design, and approval there were
many discussions with colleagues, my committee, and experts in the field about the use
of Simpson (1996) as a reference and citing the discussion related to the lack of policy
and procedure, education, and oversight from leadership within the organizations that
allow for breaches in the security. I have found that with this sample, even if there is
policy out there, the RNs are not engaged, they have never participated in policy
development for IT security, the orientation could not be recalled, and education was
reported as limited if at all. Of the education that was reported very little could be
articulated. Other than the RNs knowing that they needed to use a password, they knew
very little about IT security.
The primary themes with subthemes and UTAUT constructs were each described
in Chapter 4 and are further expounded upon in this chapter. In consideration of all
findings and how actions in response to those findings might be applied to healthcare
with associated impacts, I present the diagram in Figure 4. This diagram identifies the
three aspects of the research question (a) expressed intentions, (b) perceptions, and (c)
self-reported behaviors as they emerged from the findings. The influencing factors are
identified at a conceptual level including (a) limited orientation and education, (b) lack of
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policy participation, (c) lack of understanding, and (d) workflow needs. Finally, the
implicated risk of self-reported behaviors of IT security mishandling and the direct
impacts.

Figure 4. Diagram of findings. Reveals findings from A Qualitative Exploration of the
Security Practices of Registered Nurses identifying emerged themes within the three
aspects of the research question (a) expressed intentions, (b) perceptions, and (c) selfreported behaviors.
Limitations of the Study
Limitations of this study include that the study sample of RNs represented a
single professional nursing organization and therefore lacks generalizability. The results
from this population represent the security behaviors that can be provided in a limited
descriptive presentation but do not become predictive of the future behaviors of other RN
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populations due to multiple contributing factors within each geographic region and
organization. Additionally, the study participants were self-reporting. Limitations of
self-reported results may contain bias, are not able to be verified, and are influenced by
past or current situational experience (Brutus et al., 2013). The members may have
experience with frequent surveying by their hospitals, other agencies, and other
researchers of which I would have not known and that may create the limitation of a
lower yield in an interest of participating in this study. The potential for eliminating a
group who would normally participate in research due to over survey may have
eliminated a specific subpopulation. Lastly, the RN’s concern for the identification or
potential for leakage of information potentially leading to disciplinary action due to
variance from policy may yield false or dishonest response, limited response, or
nonresponse to the questions within the interview process may be a limitation. The
combination of self-report and fear of discipline might have skewed or influenced
response honesty.
Recommendations
The outcomes of this cases study were different than I had anticipated as I had
believed based on the literature that password sharing would become the primary area of
IT security mishandling. Perhaps because of changing times and improvements in
security and “ease-of-use” technology, the modern method of sharing accounts and
expediting workflow is badge sharing with authenticated badges. The computer
walkaway without log-off was another area of IT security mishandling that was prevalent
in the clinical area. These two aspects of variance from IT security seem to be the result
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of mismatch with workflow for patient care and need for emergent or rapid
documentation.
Future Research
The IT security mishandling behaviors of RNs provide fertile ground for future
research in the areas associated with their work environment and practice patterns as they
relate to IT security. These research studies could be done from several perspectives,
including (a) observational workflows and associated IT security, (b) observations of
what actually happens during the periods of mishandling, (c) timing of IT security
processes used in the clinical setting, (d) actual nurse use of accounts and type of
accounts with types of access to each account, and (e) comparative assessment of what IT
believes is happening/management believes is happening/and what is really happening in
the clinical area (perception/reality mismatch).
Orientation, education, and policy were identified as areas of weakness or not
present. Future research in this area could include actual tracking of education and later
evaluation of recall and assessment of usage. Inclusion of engagement of nursing within
the unit environment or relationship between IT and nursing with metrics related to IT
security knowledge and usage. Evaluation of nursing involvement in IT security policy
development with comparison to the result of IT security implementation and usage in
the clinical environment.
Future research in the area of hacking would be to better understand what RNs
learn and understand about hacking or what actions might lead to hacking. In this study,
they had a mindset on specific topics that may have limited their openness on the topic of
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hacking. In depth inquiry into effects of hacking might serve as an area of future
research related to the populations that healthcare organizations support and serve.
Implications
Positive social change as it relates to IT security has the potential to make a
substantial impact in the healthcare arena. Following the findings of this study it is
evident that the implications for social change remain ever present as they had been
described earlier, with an essential need for protection of systems, including patient
information and employee information. Any loss of integrity to the healthcare electronic
systems allows for the loss of confidence by the public. Chen et al. (2013) discussed the
complexity in the healthcare systems as being the cause for a lack of security that may
allow for risk behavior related to electronic medical record handling. I previously
presented the concept of the public perception of the protected health information
security and confidence of the security of their individual files being of high importance.
In the findings of this study, I was able to identify that the employees had a concern over
their employee information being maintained securely both as an employee and as a
patient if they were insured and cared for by the same organization. Organizational
leadership teams will need to strategically plan for IT security to be incorporated into
frontline workflow so that everyone is part of security management.
Significance to Practice
The findings of this study substantiated that for the RNs, as with most individuals,
healthcare providers, and administrators, the aspects of security include the electronic
medical record and the aspects of HIPAA, but they do not often think of the operational
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systems and management objectives that are required to secure the systems. The IT
security system for organizational information is large and complex. The RNs were not
aware of the complexity of the systems. The workflows did not match the IT security
processes. Organizational leaders must manage and safeguard the employee practices as
they relate to IT security, including workflows and authentication practices. When this
mismatch occurs, a gap analysis will be helpful to reestablish risk assessment. Insight
into how RNs practice and relate to IT security influences the development and security
of system builds. This stronger insight and understanding of the RNs’ use of the security
applications will allow administrative and IT oversight to create an opportunity for
engagement of the RNs in the development of the policy and procedure. Engaging the
RNs will provide for policies to become more nurse, clinician, employee, and patient care
friendly so that the healthcare organizations are less susceptible to risk. Security
compliance will increase if barriers to using the IT security can be minimized. Insight
into the RNs’ perception was gained during this study and will be helpful in developing
stronger processes.
Significance to Theory
In the workflow of nursing practice, the role of maintaining IT security is an
elemental part of the RN role and was expected to be a finding in this study. It was not
one of the findings. Thus, I would recommend that actions be taken to incorporate
measures into IT security processes and RN workflow to achieve this objective.
Venkatesh et al. (2003) discussed UTAUT and the constructs but did not connect
the IT security practices of employees with the perceptions of the four constructs that
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contribute to use behavior. The RNs’ expressed a lack of understanding of IT security in
this study. If there were to be an increase in understanding of the UTAUT constructs in a
meaningful way the IT security would become more applicable in the operational setting.
Out of this work, I have developed a framework for reducing barriers in security
practices that are necessary within the RN workflow, decreasing risk of protected health
information release, and decreasing security breach for the organization. This framework
is produced by providing knowledge areas for improvement to the overall security
practice at the front line. The framework for improving IT security at the frontline is
presented for implementation in clinical environment locations (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. Framework for IT security improvement. The healthcare clinical setting is
unique with workflows that demand high level security processes, engaged and educated
users.
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Based on this work toward a framework, social change is likely to be promoted by
helping employees to gain ease of use in the security practices. The change in the
promotion of the security practices might be accomplished by minimizing barriers that
will improve global security practice and reduce overall security breaches for the
organization. Of importance to the clinical personnel, there will be an associated
decrease for risk of protected health information release.
Significance to Social Change
Utilization behavior of the employee is determined through four of the constructs
identified by Venkatesh et al. (2003). The purpose of IT security is only applicable if the
employee perceives these to be important and purposeful for their practice. Identifying
the gap between current theory and perception of RNs’ related to IT security became
evident in the findings of this study. These gaps will contribute to the knowledge
contributions and implications for social change that can impact the healthcare industry.
The security mishandling by nurses as described by both Albarrak (2012) and Medlin et
al. (2008) in each of their respective studies was identified in an alternate style in this
study along with other IT security mishandling situations. These security issues are
occurring in a representative group from one of the largest subsets of the healthcare
employees within healthcare organization thus creating exposure to risk.
Healthcare costs include the burden of technology costs, security, and breach
recovery. Improvements in IT security processes within the healthcare arena would
allow for a potential impact of cost reduction, patient safety, and patient satisfaction.
Improving RNs’ engagement within each of the constructs leading to improved use

157
behavior would result in improved security protection and ultimately position healthcare
for cost reductions as a result of the decreased breach and risk.
Maintaining the confidence of the general public and minimizing any concerns
that they have related to potential security issues in an organization is important to the
bottom line financially. Increasing the security within the healthcare organizations
creates a more confident feeling for patients individually and extends to the global public.
The work of identifying the RNs’ perception with gained insight and potential for
improvement of the IT security behavior and handling of security practices could become
the catalyst to some of the change that is needed in healthcare security processes related
to IT security and management. The changes that could be made as a result of the
findings from this study are likely to extend to the community and promote increased
patient confidence.
As the findings are disseminated, organizational leaders will implement change
and include RNs in IT security planning. Confidence will grow. Two important aspects
impact the research, positive social change may be fully realized as insights and
recommendations are considered and adapted for the populations of clinical employees
such as RNs. The first is that when users are more confident that information is secure
they are more apt to use the electronic health record and with increased use, there is
potential for maximizing healthcare delivery. Second, when organizations are able to
reduce costs and resources used for security those resources can be deployed for other
healthcare contributions such as providing additional disease prevention, community
education, and further research toward healthcare advancements.
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Conclusions
Albarrak (2012), Fernández-Alemán et al. (2015), and Medlin et al. (2008), each
discussed the employee mishandling of IT security in their quantitative studies. There
was a need to understand the lived experiences of those who use the IT security. In this
study, I was able to hear the stories of what RNs experienced or believed about what their
work was related to IT security. The interaction and observations that they had related to
the topics of IT security were shared about situations and scenarios. The themes of data
did identify sharing of accounts and lack of log-off when walking away from the
computer. There was no report by any participant of direct sharing of passwords;
however, there were consistent reports of awareness for teammates password sharing
with a subset of participants’ indirect involvement in that sharing practice within their
respective work units. The summary of the RNs’ shared information and experiences
including that the patient care would always come first no matter what it takes to
accomplish that mission. This was consistent with the findings that clinicians do not
engage in IT security, including sharing passwords, before they allow harm to their
patients (Koppel, Smith, Blythe, & Kothari, 2015). Ultimately, IT security will have to
match the patient care workflow process or it will not be used.
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Appendix C: Expert Panel Participation Request Email
Title: Expert Panel Participation Request

Dear [Participant Reviewer],
I am currently a doctoral candidate in the College of Management at Walden University
studying Information Management Systems. I am conducting a dissertation study titled A
Qualitative Exploration of the Security Practices of Registered Nurses. I would be very
appreciative if you would assist me in the evaluation and validation of the qualitative
interview tool for use in this research.
The purpose of this interview is to explore the lived experiences of the nurse related to
Information Technology (IT) security. The interview is constructed to correlate with the
unified theory of acceptance and usage of technology (UTAUT) constructs to identify the
registered nurses’ perceptions, expressed intentions, and self-reported behaviors of IT
security.
The Interview Questions and Critique Form are attached for your review. Following my
receipt of all edits and comments, I will forward a final revised copy to you for review.
Please feel free to contact me with any questions at XXX XXX-XXXX or email
beth.savage@xxxx.xxx.
I look forward to your participation in creating a quality interview tool. Thank you.
Beth Savage
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Appendix D: Interview Questions
I.

II.

III.

IIII.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

Can you tell me about a time during your workday, if any, when you have walked away from the
computer without logging off?
a. Do you know if anyone has ever used your account?
b. Are you aware of any safeguards in place to protect you when you walk away without
logging off?
c. Is it a norm in your unit to log-off or not log-off when walking away from the computer?
What challenges, if any, have you had related to your password?
a. How easy is it for you to use your password?
b. Have you ever shared your account/password with coworkers?
c. In what clinical situations, if any, would sharing your account/password occur?
d. What benefit or reward is there to sharing an account/password?
e. Do passwords support your workflow?
What measures do you take to manage your password?
a. When you develop or change your password what is it composed of? (i.e. digits, letters,
symbols, minimum eight characters?)
b. What do you do when someone else knows your password?
c. How do you remember your password?
d. How often do you change it?
e. Do you ever worry about your password?
Can you tell me about your orientation, unit education, or hospital policies related to IT security?
a. Do you recall anything specific in your orientation?
b. Have you been to any recent education for IT security?
c. Does anyone on your unit talk about IT security?
d. Have you participated in a policy review for IT security?
Can you tell me who, if anyone, you would call if you had questions about the security of your
password or your account?
a. Do you have confidence that your concerns would be taken seriously?
b. Are you, or have you ever been concerned that your system is not secure?
c. Whose role is it to maintain the security of the electronic system?
As you perceive different levels of IT security, very secure to not secure, is there a difference in
your work environment?
a. If the system is more secure, does that make your job better?
b. Do you believe you are expected to know IT security as part of your job?
c. What do you believe is the practice of your teammates when handling passwords and
sharing accounts?
In what way, if any, do you believe that the employees’ actions at the computer or with a password
has any association when hacking occurs in an organization?
a. In what ways could the password handling lead to hacking?
b. What, if any, would the impact be to the employees?
c. What, if any, would the impact be to the patients?
d. What, if any, would the impact be to the organization?
What do you perceive as other aspects of IT security that I should be aware of from your
experience with IT security in your work?

